

## ABOUT THE PROJECT

IMEMO RAN together with the Brookings Institution (USA) launches a unique project with an aim to promote US-Russian cooperation on nuclear proliferation and civil nuclear power, following the announcement of a "reset" in bilateral relations and signing of a new treaty on strategic offensive arms.

One of the fundamental ideas of the project was to formulate expert proposals for further action by the two countries even before the signing of a new treaty on strategic offensive arms in order to avoid breaks and slowdown in this important international security process. The main focus was to concentrate on the analysis of ways to further reductions in strategic arms, nuclear nonproliferation and the development of peaceful nuclear energy.

A distinctive feature of the project is a combination of both joint and parallel work of two groups of professionals of the highest class from Russia and the United States, holding brainstorming sessions and the development of practically significant recommendations.

The first meeting of experts from IMEMO RAN and from the Brookings Institution was held in December 2009, in Washington, with the focus on possible steps of Russia and U.S. in nuclear disarmament after the signing of a new bilateral Treaty on strategic nuclear weapons cuts.

Panelists included Igor Ivanov (former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Security Council Secretary) and key scientists from IMEMO: Vladimir Baranovsky (Corresponding Member of RAS, Deputy Director of the Institute), [Alexander Pikayev](#) (Head of Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution) Vladimir Dvorkin (Chief Research Officer, Major General, retired) – on the Russian side. On the American side - Madeleine Albright (a prominent politician and public figure, former U.S. Secretary of State), Strobe Talbott (President of the Brookings Institution, formerly Assistant Secretary of State), Joseph Cirincione (President of Ploughshares Fund) and leading officials of the Brookings Institution - Steven Pifer (formerly U.S. ambassador to Ukraine) and Clifford Gaddy, senior researcher at the Brookings Institution.

Russian and American participants prepared materials for this meeting, with their vision of possible further steps of the two countries, as well as practical advice on the matter. Alexei Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security IMEMO RAS and Corresponding member of RAS; and Anatoly Dyakov, head of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environment at Moscow Physical-Technical Institute along with other participants facilitated the development of the materials on the Russian side.

The participants formulated practical recommendations as a follow-up to the presentations and discussions, and then I. Ivanov, M. Albright and S. Talbot submitted them to the governments of Russia and the U.S. The recommendations were well appreciated. In a reply to Ivanov, Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister expressed hopes to gain efficiency in the partnership between IMEMO RAS and the Brookings Institution, and praised the proposals made as extremely useful.

Taking into account only the actual nature of the issues, both institutions agreed to publish the materials submitted by the Russian and the American side which resulted in a booklet "[Nuclear Disarmament, Non-proliferation, Energy: Developing Further U.S.-Russian Cooperation.](#)", issued on the basis of IMEMO RAS in Russian and English.

It consists of two parts - the recommendations of Russian experts (A. Arbatov, V. Baranovsky, [A. Pikayev](#), V. Dvorkin) and American experts (J. Cirincione, C. Gaddy, S. Pifer). These two

parts are not a mirror image of each other; however, they provide a very comprehensive picture of the views of both parties, their approaches to solving a wide range of problems in the fields mentioned above. Both teams come to the conclusions that to a certain extent overlap with each other, providing basis for further collaboration.

### **Russian experts put forward several proposals on measures to further nuclear disarmament:**

- Depending on the success in achieving the future START-I Treaty and its ratification, the next step could be a new Treaty SORT / START (SORT -II). It could, for example, reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads to a level of approximately 1000-1200 by the year 2020.
- To promote the future US-Russian reductions in strategic nuclear forces an informal commitment of the third countries which possess nuclear weapons would be welcomed as not to increase their nuclear forces and to agree on a number of confidence-building measures and transparency.

U.S. and Russia may on a mutual basis abandon plans for the missile launch, relying on data from early warning systems against missile attack (“launch on warning”). The development of qualitatively new treaties on arms control, lowering the levels of strategic nuclear forces by applying a series of technical measures and changes in the nature of their deployment could be consequent upon this abandonment. U.S. and Russia could sign an agreement to place all tactical nuclear weapons in centralized storage on the national territory. Such a document would include the transfer of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe to the territory of the United States. In order to address Russia's concerns in the area of security, this should be linked to advancing the debate on the fate of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

U.S. and Russia must begin the process of gradual consolidation of their systems of early missile warning and missile defense.

### **In the area of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation the Russian side proposed the following measures:**

- Improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards by extending the strict observance of Additional Protocol, increasing scientific, technical and financial resources to implement the IAEA's activities in the area of safeguards.
- United States and Russia together with other partners should work to strengthen the existing multilateral export control regimes and the comprehensive observance of the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1887.
- Stringent procedures for withdrawal from the NPT should be introduced in the coming years by substantial price-rise for a decision to withdraw from the NPT.
- United States and Russia should take the lead in achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and persuade Iran to abandon the divisive component of the nuclear program.
- It is necessary that new multilateral agreements should be concluded and should enter into force, especially the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.
- In tight deadlines nuclear powers must show steady progress in fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of NPT. *Russian experts made the following suggestions for cooperation in civil nuclear field:*

▶ US-Russian HEU-LEU agreement has helped Russia to take a significant share of the nuclear fuel market in the U.S. After 2012, it is expedient to continue the practice of permitting Russian commercial companies to access the U.S. market or even expand it. It would help preserve the interdependence between U.S. and Russian companies in the civil nuclear sector and would contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations in general.

▶ It is expected to cease the access of the American side to Russian nuclear facilities after the completion of the assistance programs. The aim of this access is to verify the implementation of projects to improve security measures. However, a further provision of such access would facilitate a more reliable implementation of security measures. U.S. may require retaining this access as a condition for the continuation of the Russian commercial supply of LEU fuel for civil nuclear U.S. markets following the termination of the HEU-LEU program in 2012.

▶ During the implementation of the project on cooperative threat reduction, U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists have created an extensive network of bilateral cooperation. The project significance goes beyond the narrow scientific partnerships and it positively influences the development of broader bilateral political relations between the two countries. Expected completion of the assistance programs in the coming years would be able to have a devastating effect on this co-operation with all the negative consequences. U.S. and Russia need to maintain the bilateral scientific cooperation in the nuclear field by maintaining the temporary tax breaks and other privileges, as well as providing grants for bilateral projects.

▶ Resuscitation of US-Russia 123 Agreement will open the Russian market for U.S. civil nuclear goods and services. It will also allow Russia to import spent reactor fuel of U.S. origin from third countries. This agreement was linked by the Bush Administration with the cooperation of Russia in solving the Iranian nuclear issue. Moscow believes that it has fulfilled our part of the deal. The continued U.S. unwillingness to enter 123 Agreement into force could undermine the trust between the U.S. and Russia and complicate the achievement of such informal bilateral arrangements in the future.

▶ The creation of international centers for uranium enrichment is a useful initiative aimed at ensuring broad access to peaceful use of nuclear energy and at the same time at preserving the non-proliferation regimes. However, this idea is not ready. U.S. and Russia, together with other responsible nuclear suppliers should create an international group of high level experts to develop several options for establishing such centers. Political multilateral negotiations may begin at a later stage. These would build on the proposed options.