

**INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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**THE EURO-ATLANTIC REGION:
SECURITY CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A JOINT RESPONSE**

*Report to the meeting of the
Commission on Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative
(Munich, February 7–8, 2010)*

**MOSCOW
IMEMO RAN
2010**

УДК 327.36
ББК 66.4(0)
Bar 24

Bar 24

Baranovsky Vladimir. The Euro-Atlantic Region: Security Challenges and Opportunities for a Joint Response / Report to the Meeting of the Commission on Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (Munich, February 7–8, 2010). – M., IMEMO RAN, 2010. – p.

ISBN 978-5-9535-0258-0

The report “The Euro-Atlantic Region: Security Challenges and Opportunities for a Joint Response” has been written by corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Baranovsky for the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), a new, high-level international commission. The EASI was launched by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is implemented by the group of prominent politicians and experts from Russia, the USA and Europe with the goal to elaborate proposals on the new Euro-Atlantic security structure. Co-Chairs of the EASI Commission are: former US senator Sam Nunn, ex-foreign minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and ex-vice-foreign minister of Germane Wolfgang Ischinger. IMEMO is the key partner of the project in Russia. All participants of the project see the solution of the problems not through the prism of Russian-Western relations, but in the context of common threats to the security. Such an approach serves for more effective promotion of Russian vision of all-European security. The EASI project and Russian active participation in it were recognized as expedient by the President of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This report starts the series of publications under IMEMO and EASI aegis in Russia. The author considers the formation of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture as a broad and multi-faceted undertaking. Within this “big project” it is important to initiate and promote a number of parallel processes, focused on the development or renewal of various types of structural security elements in the Euro-Atlantic space. The goal is the development of an entire network of treaty instruments for governance and joint actions based on territorial and problematic principles. Such mechanisms, as well as interaction of participating states could create a true fabric of Euro-Atlantic security. This approach Vladimir Baranovsky defines as a *variable geometry model of Euro-Atlantic security*.

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ISBN 978-5-9535-0258-0

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SUMMARY

The formation of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture is considered as a broad and multi-faceted project affecting various aspects of the situation in the region and beyond. The purpose of this undertaking is to ensure stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to solve security-related issues through joint efforts of the countries of the region.

Within the “big project” it is expedient to initiate and promote multiple parallel processes, focused on setting up or renewing various structural security elements in the Euro-Atlantic space. The overall orientation is the development of an entire network of treaty governance and joint actions instruments that would operate on the basis of territorial principles and/or problem areas approach. Some of these instruments may be created within the framework of existing multilateral institutional agencies or in conjunction with them; others may emerge from their reform (or, conversely, stimulate it), while others may appear independently.

The network could, for example, include treaties and agreements on peace support operations, combating terrorism, energy security (effectively an updated Treaty on Energy Charter), countering cross-border criminal activities, security and cooperation in the Arctic, the suppression of piracy, etc. They will not have a uniform character and will not fall under a set of common standards (neither in structure nor in participants), but in the aggregate they would create a true fabric of Euro-Atlantic security.

This approach could be defined as a *variable geometry model of Euro-Atlantic security*.

1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

This report employs a number of basic concepts whose use and meaning need to be clarified at the outset. They are not intended as carefully refined, comprehensive, analytically rigorous definitions, but as tools permitting more or less unanimous understanding of frequently cited realities and conceptual images. In the context of the present report, this understanding may be fairly schematic, sometimes deliberately simplified, and in any case purely conventional.

Security threats are understood as events that can seriously or even radically undermine the existence of a socio-political entity or prejudice its vital interests.

The extent to which a socio-political entity is prepared and able to change the nature of its existence (or even its identity), what interests should be considered vital, and what is an acceptable (and unacceptable) level of potential damage remain indeterminate. There are no universal criteria on this matter. In practice, what matters is *official policy*—that is, the way the state, parties, movements, organizations, and multilateral alliances define security.

Are their approaches appropriate and do they reflect the character of the discourse on security that currently exists in society? This depends on the characteristics of the political system, its capacity to form and express individual, corporate and collective interests, translate them into practical policy, and persuade key constituencies that they are in the public interest. It is by this process that a meaningful *understanding of security* comes about—including an understanding of how it is to be maintained and by expending what level of resources.

This understanding, therefore, may well have a variable nature and be subject to lobbying and other influences from within the entity. Variations and adjustments may also occur as a result of interaction with other entities (states, alliances etc.) If interacting entities have different understanding of security, this may obviously bring about mutual confrontation. But their contact may also push the parties towards rapprochement based on a reassessment of the limits of flexibility and the benefits of cooperative interaction.

This report rests on the assumption that the possibility of such a cooperative interaction on security issues exists *within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic space*. The latter is defined as the geopolitical area consisting of the United States, Europe, and Russia. Their joint efforts can ensure *Euro-Atlantic security*, that is, the protection of this area from destabilizing threats.

The image of a triangular configuration formed by the U.S., Europe, and Russia, is not flawless. Suffice it to say that even the boundaries of Europe, which occupies the central place in this image, are not unambiguous. For example, uncertainty exists over whether it is right to “exclude” Russia from Europe, or to include the South Caucasus countries in it.

Furthermore, for geopolitical reasons and taking into account the realities of NATO and the OSCE, Canada also belongs to the Euro-Atlantic space (in this sense it would be more appropriate to designate this part of the Euro-Atlantic “triangle” North America.). The United States and Russia also have significant security interests beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Justified as these qualifications are, however, they do not call into question the appropriateness of a *holistic*, generalized analysis of the problem of security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Methodologically, this report proceeds from the following criteria.

- The main focus is on the shared challenges to the region and the opportunities for a common response to them. Such challenges and opportunities do exist; it is their existence that is treated here as a system-building quality which can transform the disorderly and fuzzy set “U.S., Europe, Russia...” into a structured pattern “U.S. + Europe + Russia”. Only then is the Euro-Atlantic region, Euro-Atlantic space, Euro-Atlantic security meaningful as a geopolitical reality (or at least as an *emerging reality*), rather than simply an abstraction.
- However, it is important to assess realistically the magnitude, weight and significance of this integrated approach. It is not the only nor even - in many ways – the prevalent one in the security assessments of the main players in the Euro-Atlantic space. The United States, Europe, and Russia all have other priorities, and when there is a conflict with Euro-Atlantic values, it is far from always resolved in favor of the latter.

Will such situations compromise Euro-Atlantic security? This is a question of the dialectics of quantity and quality. If “deviations” from the logic of a joint approach to security problems become more the rule than the exception, if they involve increasingly significant problems, and if constructing a cooperative approach grows increasingly difficult, then the collapse of the Euro-Atlantic security model will soon be unavoidable. But a dialectic with an upward trajectory can produce a cumulative effect in the opposite direction; every agreement, movement, even just a statement inspired by a feeling of co-operative interaction will create the reality of Euro-Atlantic security.

- In theory there is a dichotomy between two approaches to security issues. One treats them as a *common problem* affecting the basic interests of all, and, hence, requiring joint action.¹ The other seeks to achieve a *balance of interests*, assuming the need for compromises, diplomatic “exchanges”, quid pro quo, etc.² The first approach is

¹ For example: Iranian missiles pose a threat to all countries of the region, which should unite against this common challenge.

² Continuing the proposed example: for a joint approach to the issue of Iran's missile challenge one has to “trade off” the U.S. intention to deploy missile defense elements in Europe (to which Moscow objects) against Russia's unwillingness to impose serious sanctions on Iran (which has caused dissatisfaction in

certainly more organic for the concept of Euro-Atlantic security outlined above, but the second is more pragmatic. In the end, Euro-Atlantic security cannot be built without compromises between parties, but it cannot be built *solely* on compromises in the absence of a sense of common challenges, common threats, and common problems.

- Analytically, the internal and external aspects of Euro-Atlantic security can also be differentiated to reflect endogenous and exogenous threats to stability. Within the region there are unresolved conflicts and potential sources of tension, and a variety of “new security challenges.” There are also inertial manifestation of confrontation, menacing flare-ups, and fears of new lines of division. Hence a “collective security” approach is needed (albeit one with new content). With respect to external security threats, protecting against them has always been and remains a strong incentive to seek multilateral solutions. Although it is clearly premature to refer to a traditional model of “common defense” in relation to the Euro-Atlantic region, noteworthy changes are possible or are already taking place, including more proactive behavior as well as the tools being employed. In general, the distinction between internal and external security challenges is by and large being eroded, and gradually becoming less relevant both analytically and politically.
- Foreign policy priorities and security priorities are closely related and often overlap, but they are not identical. In particular, the foreign policy of any country in the Euro-Atlantic region and its cooperative or competitive relationship with other countries may be determined not by security considerations alone. Still, threats and challenges related to security—*i.e.*, to the vital aspects of a country’s existence—should objectively prevail over other motives in driving foreign policy.

2. THE NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT: INCENTIVES TO INTERACTION

All three parts of the Euro-Atlantic space—the United States, Europe, and Russia—are feeling the effects of the *new global context*. Its impact on their approach to security is rather contradictory and often leads in different directions. It is important that this new context does generate incentives encouraging the United States, Europe, and Russia towards cooperative interaction. Allowing for differences in interpretation, specific trends in global international political development carry significant security implications for all the three main actors.

- Imbalances in the system of international relations resulting from the end of bipolarity have increased uncertainty on the world stage, concerns because of possible local and regional turmoil, unclear medium- and long term development prospects. *The U.S., Europe, and Russia have an objective interest in stabilizing the international political system.* Its increasing entropy creates for them more dangerous threats than attractive opportunities. Minimizing possible destabilizing

Washington).

consequences of international political development is essential for strengthening Euro-Atlantic security. This is the broadest framework for joint action by the United States, Europe, and Russia (for instance, in the area of conflict management and so on).

- The economic crisis of 2008-2009 introduced interesting new parameters into the question of Euro-Atlantic security. Its magnitude was recognized as comparable with the largest economic upheaval of the last century, which affected all the major countries of the world-- the 1929-1933 crisis and Great Depression. That crisis shifted the trend of international political development towards a new world war. By contrast, the impact of the current crisis on world politics has had a stabilizing effect. ***In the conditions of the global crisis, the U.S., Europe, and Russia have proclaimed their interest in working together to overcome it, as well as in building a more sustainable and equitable global economic system.*** This approach not only meshes naturally with the logic of a “Euro-Atlantic project,” but also objectively brings its members closer together.

However, at least two constraining (indeed countervailing) factors arise at this point. First, if the crisis extends the horizon of economic thinking to a global level, “Euro-Atlantism,” in fact, reduces it to a group level, even if the group contains a number of leading economic world powers. Secondly, if in the wake of the crisis the convergence of the most advanced countries in Europe and North America occurs naturally due to the relatively higher homogeneity and interoperability of their economies, the effect on Russia is exactly the opposite: alongside its inclusion in the G20, the G8 is often reduced to the G7.

- Arms control has been one of the victims of the chaotic and contradictory processes that have occurred since the Cold War ended. Over the last decade efforts in this sphere have come to a virtual standstill in the Euro-Atlantic region. ***The United States, Europe, and Russia have an objective interest in overcoming degradation in the field of arms control and giving negotiated agreements a renewed impetus..*** The reasons are partly intrinsic, that is, to rationalize defense efforts in terms of cost-effectiveness and other parameters, while ensuring a stabilizing effect for both the participants and the broader international political system. Partly they are increasingly extrinsic, that is, to serve as a tool to influence the surrounding world by producing a demonstration effect, establishing standards and regulations, legitimizing sanctions in response to their non-observance, and so on.

In some specific areas of arms control, contemporary international political developments objectively stimulate the formation of a unified Euro-Atlantic approach, as in the case of nuclear non-proliferation. In the field of arms control, however, there is also a possibility of quite significant deviations from the logic of Euro-Atlantic cooperation in the direction of purely/predominantly national security interests and concerns.

- The international arena witnesses a redistribution of relative weight characterizing various existing and emerging centers of influence. In the global balance of

economic and political forces the strengthening positions of China and India are increasingly becoming an important factor, a trend likely to continue into the future. A number of other countries in Asia and Latin America are also developing intensively. The presence of the Islamic world is ever more visible on the international stage (albeit not as some integral whole, “pole” or “power center”). ***The U.S., Europe, and Russia have an objective interest in ensuring that the rise of new centers does not marginalize them, “old” actors, but occurs with their guidance.*** An important aspect of Euro-Atlantic security is minimizing the challenges from competing centers through cooperative interaction with them. The higher the level of consolidation of the “old” centers in such interaction, the less likely will be a prospect of confronting them against each other and playing on the contradictions between them.

- There is a gradual shift in the center of gravity of the international system from Europe towards Asia. The main problematic themes of international political development are occurring in a broad band stretching from the wider Middle East and Caucasus through Central and South Asia and to the extended Far East. ***The United States, Europe, and Russia have an objective interest in the southern vicinities of Asia not becoming a zone of permanent armed violence and lawlessness, a source of chaos and terrorism, or an area for hegemonic pretensions and rampant geopolitical rivalry.*** As far as possible they should act as external stabilizers in this region. Without vigorous efforts to foster larger Asia's political stability, Euro-Atlantic security itself will remain precarious and fragile.
- In the long term, the main intrigue within the emerging international political system will be managing the relationship between the developed and developing world. ***The U.S., Europe, and Russia have an objective interest in minimizing the explosive potential generated by the North-South dichotomy.*** . Here precisely is where the main external threat to Euro-Atlantic security resides in the form of growing protest potential in that part of the global society that regards itself as not only disadvantaged but largely without future prospects.

The Euro-Atlantic region countries will be the main targets of dysfunctional behavior springing from this soil (violence, terrorism, uncontrolled migration, etc.). They will have to constantly look for opportunities to minimize the devastating pressures – by engaging in direct counter-action against them, seeking to cut off their sources, and attempting to influence the power elites of the countries where they originate. It is unlikely that a global “social contract” can be reached or a comprehensive set of formal rules created in this area, but concrete agreements on various issues of concern may be quite viable and useful. Essential would be to form a sense of community and responsibility in the face of this global challenge, which must be implanted in the public consciousness and on the political agendas of countries in the Euro-Atlantic space.

- The modern international political landscape is further complicated by internal conflicts arising out of ethnic and religious differences, inter-clan fighting, separatist aspirations, the ineptitude of state entities and their collapse, and the

emergence of new states when complicated by a tortured process of self-identification. *The U.S., Europe, and Russia have an objective interest in domestic conflicts not becoming a source of international political complications.* Their concerted or joint approaches to such situations, allowing them to minimize the possibility of rivalry and confrontation in this area and at the same time helping to resolve conflicts, could become an important part of maintaining Euro-Atlantic security.

- Although the “Westphalian” tradition focuses on the absolute, or at least the most restrictive interpretation of the grounds for and the scale of external interference in the internal affairs of states, modern international trends conflict with this logic. *The U.S., Europe, and Russia have an objective interest in the possibility of exerting external influence on those domestic political situations that could have a destabilizing effect internationally.* It is in their interest to reach agreement regarding the terms of such an influence, its objectives, tools to be used, and limitations on their use.

This is also important because we deal here with an extremely sensitive topic that affects national sovereignty and needs to be approached with caution. Otherwise it will gravely threaten the existing world order by moving away from the rule of law and towards the unrestricted law of force. The challenge, the answer to which is vital in terms of Euro-Atlantic security, is to develop suitable methods and procedures governing external intervention, including the possible use of force, not through the arbitrary rejection of international law, but through its consolidation and development.

- Bringing to a common denominator the imperatives of internal development and those of international behavior, insofar as they confront each other, represents one of the most difficult challenges. *The United States, Europe, and Russia have an objective interest in developing collaborative approaches to the conflict-prone themes of existential character, both actual and potential—that is, where the sources of tension are less situational and more caused by problems of principle.* They include (1) the mutual responsibility of states in the use and transborder transfer of natural resources; (2) efforts to ensure their own security and how other states perceive such efforts; (3) the conflict between the right of peoples to self-determination, and the territorial integrity of states; and so on. At this stage, in most cases it makes no sense to talk about formal agreements, but simply keeping these subjects on the agenda can be an important element of Euro-Atlantic identity.

3. SPECIFICS OF THE U.S., EUROPEAN, AND RUSSIAN APPROACHES

The United States, Europe, and Russia all have their own policy with regard to the outside world and security problems. The aim here is not to deal comprehensively with the distinctions in these three actors’ general foreign policy. What follows is an attempt to identify those aspects that are significant for Euro-Atlantic security. In the final analysis, this determines both the opportunities and the constraints for the United States, Europe, and Russia in the formation of a *common* Euro-Atlantic security area.

The United States

- The United States, of course, occupies a special position in the global system, due to both its extremely broad range of international interests and its enormous potential to influence international affairs. Its role in the global economy, finance, trade, science, and information technology is unique and will remain so for the foreseeable future. In the size and quality of its military capabilities, the United States has no equal in the world, apart from Russia's considerable store of nuclear weapons.
- On this basis, in the early 2000s strong emphasis was placed on the maintenance of U.S. preponderance and leadership in authoritarian and power-oriented forms. However, the wager on the formation of a unipolar world model in which the United States as "the sole remaining superpower" would be an unchallenged demiurge proved untenable. The excesses of the neo-conservative course dashed the possibility that the United States would gain moral leadership, caused latent or open opposition to it (including from its allies), and became the source of new lines of tension in the international political system. Barack Obama's administration, therefore, has set about changing the paradigm of U.S. foreign policy, shifting towards a model of leadership in international affairs without the hegemonic component.
- Despite the tremendous opportunities the United States has in the international political system, its dependence on others is also significant. Moreover, this dependence is increasing, and in some respects, becoming a vulnerability. At the same time a relative decrease in the role of the European element in American security concerns and priorities is also occurring. The place of Europe, however, remains quite prominent in terms of providing a "reliable rear" and generating partners to meet the challenges from other geopolitical areas, particularly the extended Middle East.

Conclusions

- (i) In light of Washington's foreign policy adjustment, the prospect of cooperative interaction on security issues with other members of the Euro-Atlantic space now seems more attractive and realistic.
- (ii) But the main appeal for the United States, and probably one of the key requirements for Washington's support for the Euro-Atlantic security project is the prospect of gaining additional opportunities in other areas.
- (iii) The development of Euro-Atlantic security systems will largely depend on U.S. support. The U.S. contribution to the system, particularly its military resources, will likely remain larger than that of any other participant.

Europe

- The prevailing sentiment in European public opinion and among the political class is against an increase in appropriations for military purposes and security. These

include those that may be necessary in the context of Euro-Atlantic security. While Europeans appear confident that Europe is not menaced by major internal military and political threats, they worry increasingly about non-military security challenges.

- The awareness of Russia's geopolitical proximity and Europe's dependence on it for energy supplies generates a contradictory response ranging from wariness and neo-containment policy to a renewed emphasis on engagement strategy.
- In a territory of more than forty states, there is no consolidated foreign and security policy. The development of the "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP) and the "European Security and Defense Policy" (ESDP) within the EU are, of course, a huge advance in this direction, but even the progress that has been made, as well as the expected innovations arising from the Lisbon Treaty, do not compensate for differences and divergent views on many security issues. The "dividing lines" in Europe are diverse and labile. They may run within a group of European "grand states" or between "old" and "new" EU and NATO members. They result from the dissimilar composition of these two organizations as well as from the difference between countries that do and do not belong to them. Most often they arise because of the specific interests, preferences, concerns, and sensitivities of individual countries.
- There is an element of uncertainty associated with institutional polyphony on the European continent. This raises two issues with unclear prospects: first, the limits to EU and NATO enlargement, as well as, second, the possibility of self-expression for the countries that do not belong to them.
- The existence of at least two major zones of potential conflict--the Balkans and the Caucasus--constitutes a serious destabilizing factor. For this reason, however, Europe has become a sort of training ground where peacekeeping approaches and tools have been tested, sometimes successfully, but often with disappointing results.

Conclusions

(i) In the countries of this region attitudes towards the prospects of improving Euro-Atlantic security are ambivalent. The need to strengthen it as well as the limited effectiveness of the mechanisms that exist for these purposes are widely recognized. But there is no support for the idea of fundamentally "rebuilding" of these mechanisms.

(ii) Cooperative engagement with Russia is generally considered appropriate and deserving of greater attention, and none would wish to abandon it. At the same time the policies of Moscow are viewed with caution, especially after the 2008 war in South Ossetia.

(iii) Europe's dependence on Russia for its hydrocarbons is a powerful factor focusing attention on Russia and evoking the issue of Euro-Atlantic security. Yet, this very dependence spurs even more strongly a desire to "bypass" Russia and establish alternative supply channels.

Russia

- On the level of its official policy, Russia plays an initiative role in promoting Euro-Atlantic security issues. It does so in the first instance because it would like to overcome its alienation from the main international political developments on the continent. This aspect is important to it both pragmatically (to shift the NATO- and EU-centrism of the European international political system towards a more balanced one) and for political/psychological reasons (to compensate for losses and unfulfilled expectations with regard to Europe track, neutralize the growing sense of being marginalized, etc.). “Russia is returning to Europe:” - this is the message addressed to both external and internal audiences.
- The Russian project contains overt criticisms of developments in Europe after the Cold War. “Draw a line under the past and start all over again” is the political message coming from Moscow in an almost unveiled form. It contains a certain “revisionist” quality due to the rejection of many of the new European realities, but it also has a rational and pragmatic purpose. The latter consists in overcoming the impasse over the question of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia by agreeing to legitimize (de facto or even de jure) the existing situation.
- Russia’s initiative on Euro-Atlantic issues allows to define its foreign policy activity in this area as a constructive phenomenon focusing on co-operative relationships with Western countries. It may, however, also have a hidden subtext – to devaluate the aggressive geopolitical demagoguery of recent years as intended primarily to shore up the regime’s self-identity and consolidate elites around the government. This, however, should not obscure the fact that the Medvedev/Putin regime is seeking to westernize the country, and in this effort it should be vigorously supported by its external partners. Another variation on this theme postulates differences within the elite, between the European-oriented advocates of modernization and the anti-European conservatives. This should not be considered mere theater; at the very least it reveals some significant fault lines in Russian society.
- The lack of specifics in Russia’s original approach was not a deficiency, as many felt in the West. On the contrary, it opened the way for a debate on strengthening security across the broadest possible spectrum. When Moscow advanced more specific proposals, these were more narrowly focused. There are now reasons to suspect that they reflect more selfish aspirations, with the intention of weakening Western mechanisms for multilateral cooperation, and the desire to obtain *droit de regard* over them. Still, it is obvious that these are negotiating proposals and that they can and should be transformed into mutually acceptable contractual, legal and political norms of Euro-Atlantic security.

Conclusions

(i), Moscow has already made a significant political investment in the Euro-Atlantic security project. The failure of the latter would deal a painful blow to Russia’s prestige and self-perception.

(ii) At the same time it would unfortunately reinforce a widespread feeling that the West is

unconstructive and non-cooperative, or, worse, bent on pursuing a hostile policy towards Russia. This would give conservative Russian elements an additional opportunity to consolidate anti-liberal trends within the country and confrontational trends in its foreign policy.

(iii) In Russia's approach to Euro-Atlantic security two factors play a major role: the domestic political context and concerns over developments in the post-Soviet space.

(iv) Russia's project to this point is still amorphous. It can yet develop along different trajectories, some of which could repel Russia's partners because of suspicions about its motives and goals (*e.g.*, to weaken NATO or to obtain the right of veto over the enlargement of the alliance) or because some of its proposals are unacceptable or unworkable (such as the principle of not diminishing the security of other countries). But eventual movement along other trajectories could turn useful and productive.

4. AREAS OF GEOPOLITICAL ATTENTION

In terms of challenges to Euro-Atlantic security and opportunities to strengthen it, some geographical areas are of particular importance. They should be the subject of priority attention.

Some of these have a long troublesome history and are zones where international political efforts have been exerted for decades. Placing them in the larger context of Euro-Atlantic security will not necessarily lead to miraculous results. But there may be "added value" in new attempts at joint efforts.

Dealing with these cases may be even more important for minimizing strategic competition among the various players in the Euro-Atlantic space, Rivalry on the grounds of security considerations, economic gains or losses, access to resources, and external political influence poses a major obstacle to constructive Euro-Atlantic interaction.

The problem areas in question are well known and lack neither analytical nor political attention. Therefore, they are only briefly sketched below. An exception is made only for the Arctic where a breakthrough development seems possible on the basis of Euro-Atlantic cooperation.

(i) ***Western Balkans.*** The list of problems is voluminous, but the main requirements for stabilization are clear enough (economic reconstruction, marginalization of radicalist trends, restoring and building inter-ethnic understanding, regional cooperation, and membership in the EU). The effect of Euro-Atlantic cooperation is not of vital importance, but would be useful by providing additional opportunities for a cooperative Russian presence easing energy supply, means of transit, and participation in international operations to enhance stability at regional and local levels.

(ii) ***South Caucasus.*** In contrast to the Balkans, this zone is the least "open" for Euro-Atlantic cooperation, given the lack of prospects for a solution to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian problems, the tensions in Moscow's relations with Georgia and Georgia's drift toward the United States and NATO, as well as signs of a "great game" unfolding in the region. It is precisely for these reasons that the need for Euro-Atlantic cooperation in this area is greater than anywhere else. Because the U.S. presence in South Caucasus is

neuralgic for the Russian leadership, it is preferable to emphasize the central role of the EU as an extraregional participant in stabilization efforts.

(iii) **Black Sea region.** This provides more opportunities than the South Caucasus as a testing ground for an incremental increase in Euro-Atlantic cooperation. There is a good foundation in the form of several years of low-key, but quite productive activities of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). One of the main issues requiring a compromise remains the question of pipeline routes out of the region.

(iv) **Moldova and Transnistria.** This is another area in which Euro-Atlantic cooperation can have a positive effect, while in its absence, a fairly high level of uncertainty and potential instability will remain. The most promising format for a resolution seems to be a formula involving Russia, Ukraine and the EU as external stabilizers.

(v) **Post-Soviet space.** Embracing or overlapping with some of the above-mentioned areas, this is the most “difficult” challenge, given the complexes and concerns of Russia, as well as the policy volatility of other CIS states. Some of the most serious Russia’s sensitivities have been recently attenuated – such as the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO, the establishment of its military and political cooperation with the United States, the prospect of Russia’s fleet being evicted from Sevastopol. Others persist – such as a possibility of Moldova’s or Belarus’s drift to the West. The “Eastern Partnership” with the EU has also emerged as a concern. ***The competitive interplay of Russia, the United States and NATO in the post-Soviet space poses the main obstacles to cooperation on Euro-Atlantic security.***

The most rational means of minimizing them is a cautious and gradual buildup of a “tripartite” cooperation based on a formula of: Russia + the CIS country in question + a Western partner and coupled with the de facto recognition of the paramount importance of Russia. For the latter, the “individual” nature of this formula makes it more attractive (*i.e.* when it is offered to each of the partners from the CIS individually, and not to all of them at once), but other options are also possible, such as involving Russia in the EU’s “Eastern Partnership”

(vi) **Middle East** This is the “near abroad” of the Euro-Atlantic space and the zone of critical instability. It could be the source of the most serious external threats to Euro-Atlantic security—in particular, for the Western countries, but also for Russia. It requires highly focused attention. The Euro-Atlantic format for mobilizing international political efforts at stabilization (*i.e.*, involving the United States, Europe, and Russia) should be persistently sought for again and again.

(vii) **The Arctic.** This may become one of the most important issues on the Euro-Atlantic agenda. The need for unflagging attention to this question stems from the growing economic, military, political, and environmental significance of the Arctic region.

- With the reduction in readily available hydrocarbon reserves in other regions as well as the development of underwater mining technology, it is becoming increasingly profitable and desirable to develop offshore oil and gas fields in the Arctic seas.

Due to global warming, deposits of oil and gas and other natural resources now hidden beneath thick ice are likely to become accessible.

- The reproduction of marine biological resources of the seas of the Arctic Ocean as well as the high-latitude regions of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are an important factor in the development of the coastal regions of Arctic states. Biological resources extracted there are one of the most valuable sources of protein supply and provide the main livelihood for millions of people.
- These spaces are progressively more involved in the domestic and international economy. With global warming, the increased period of seasonal navigation has raised their transport value. Climate change and the shrinking of the area covered by Arctic ice could lead to a significant buildup in traffic. The Northern Maritime Route and the Northwest Passage could become major highways of global importance over the coming decades.
- The preservation of natural ecosystems and biodiversity in the Arctic is of global ecological significance.

Increased economic activity and intensifying international competition in high-latitude regions raise the risk of clashes and conflicts between states in the region as well as non-state economic actors operating there.

The leading Arctic states have naturally begun to pay greater attention to questions of regional security. Russia considers the Arctic one of its priority regions in ensuring national security. It is also becoming the object of increasing attention from the NATO alliance, which includes five of the eight Arctic states. These circumstances may promote a basis for cooperation, but may also contribute to an arms race in the Arctic and growing military-political tensions.

The international political situation in the Arctic is complicated by the relative lack of an international legal treaty framework for governing interstate cooperation in the region. This applies particularly to security issues. In the economic and environmental sphere international governance in the Arctic is mainly restricted to bilateral agreements, whereas multilateral cooperation is carried out only on specific economic and environmental protection issues. With respect to the military-political and other aspects of security in the Arctic, there are practically no multilateral agreements to ensure a stable framework for interstate relations. This deficiency is not offset by the activities of informal advisory institutions such as the Arctic Council (since 1996).

In these circumstances, the establishment of political and international legal frameworks for constructive interaction in the sphere of military, environmental and economic security in the Arctic becomes pressing. The core of this process could be a *treaty (agreement) on security and cooperation in the Arctic*. Its signing could resolve a number of important tasks:

- Provide a framework for observing the sovereign rights of states to the Arctic territories and offshore areas belonging to them.
- Create an international legal mechanism for the peaceful settlement of the many territorial disputes in the region.
- Reach agreement, in a form that is effective, non-discriminatory and acceptable to the Arctic states, on access by other states as well as by non-state actors for the economic and scientific development of the region, while respecting the required environmental and military security.

In general, such an agreement would help to determine common goals and interests in the area of maintaining military, environmental and economic security in the Arctic, as well as to create a politico-legal framework for coordinating the military policy of the Arctic states and preventing conflict situations. This corresponds to the objectives of strengthening mutual confidence and stability, not only among the eight states in the region, but also in a broader international context. In this sense, the proposed agreement could be an important element in maintaining Euro-Atlantic security.

5. INSTITUTIONAL AND TREATY PATTERNS

In discussing the problems of strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic space primary attention is often devoted to questions of reforming its existing institutional architecture. This emphasis is characteristic above all of Russian officials and analysts. Two main criticisms are leveled against the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation in Europe: first, that efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts—as in the Balkans and more recently troubled areas in the former USSR—are ineffective, and, second, that a shift of the political center of gravity towards the EU and NATO has occurred, accompanied by the growing practice of taking decisions over the objections and concerns raised by Moscow. Opinion is also expressed that there are too many agencies claiming a role in European security affairs, which leads to unnecessary competition, duplication, and fragmentation of efforts.

Many different scenarios exist for reforming the system of multilateral cooperation in Europe (and by extension - in the Euro-Atlantic area): from minor adjustments (*status quo plus*) to radical restructuring (fully dismantling the existing mechanisms and building new ones from scratch). The question lies in the political acceptability of such proposals and their practical effectiveness. It seems that *the more radical the approach, the less its political acceptability and the more doubtful its effectiveness*.

In the general context, when posing and solving the task of updating security structures in the Euro-Atlantic region, it seems appropriate to take into account the following:

- It is completely legitimate to raise the issue of both the effectiveness of the existing multilateral organizations in Europe, and their broader cooperation in strengthening security. But neither of these requires their experience or practice acquired over time should be lost.

- It is important to bear in mind that the vast majority of Euro-Atlantic states see no need for drastic changes; they consider that, while the existing mechanism of multilateral cooperation may not be completely effective, it still performs its functions more or less satisfactorily.
- The chances seem slim of creating from scratch a structural entity that would assume responsibility for Euro-Atlantic security. In addition, many of the functions it would assume are already the responsibility existing organizations, which would require a new delimitation in the event that such an organization were created.
- The difficulties of reaching an effective response to crises in Europe is generated not so much by a lack of institutions as by a lack of commitment by member states needed to reach consensus. This is a problem not of institutions, but of political will. Another problem on the same level is an unwillingness of member states to expand the independent activities of regional organizations and to give them greater autonomy.

Therefore, what is needed for the development of the Euro-Atlantic institutional architecture is *not a “breakthrough”, but incremental upgrading and interaction* of agencies operating in the region that are involved in questions of security. In this field, each of them can have (and, in fact, already has) its niche, while all together they would form pool of security-promoting institutions. Not much more is needed at this stage, only, first, to clarify the Euro-Atlantic context of their activities, and second, to minimize the associated political irritants for certain partners in the Euro-Atlantic region.

(1) *OSCE*. This agency is notable for the wide range of tasks assigned to it in developing principles, methods, institutions, and mechanisms for the maintenance of European security. The overall results of its activities in the field of conflict resolution are mixed, with both successes and failures. But in general, the OSCE has several advantages compared with other multilateral agencies operating in the region, including its broad membership, the rule of consensus, and a comprehensive approach to security matters. Admittedly, the reverse side of these advantages is the difficulty of developing a common policy.

There is widespread skepticism over the possibility of breathing new life into the OSCE. Yet in the context of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, a minimal goal for this agency should be:

- While subjecting the OSCE to the criticism, not to lose the experience it has gained in the institutional, intellectual and political approach to a wide variety of security-related issues. The overwhelming majority of security-related questions have already received lengthy consideration within the OSCE and, in many cases, generated considerable agreement.
- To draw up an inventory of approaches and formulae that have been developed by the OSCE on issues of multilateral security cooperation. These may contain mutually acceptable wording on and interesting practical solutions to even the most controversial and difficult current problems.

- To seek opportunities to increase the role of the OSCE, if the idea of organizing “Helsinki-2” is not limited to holding a summit, but is interpreted more broadly.. In particular, to enhance its role to the level of NATO and the EU, when organizing the interaction of the main multilateral institutions working in the field of security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

(2) **NATO**. This is the predominant multilateral entity in the Euro-Atlantic region engaged in security matters. NATO's role and activity must be given a cooperative impetus with regard to Russia, otherwise the very idea of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture will fail to be implemented.

The challenge, therefore, is to “reset” Russia’s relations with NATO. This has two components.

- The issue of the further extension of the alliance into post-Soviet territory should be removed from the foreground. The inclusion in NATO of Ukraine (above all) and Georgia is for Moscow absolutely unacceptable. The development and implementation of any other scenario will require an extremely cautious, carefully measured approach.
- Relations between Russia and NATO should be given extensive constructive content, so that the parties become important partners for each other.

Such interaction will be crucial in forming common security space between Russia and NATO. This currently seems relevant to Afghanistan, but should not be excluded in relation to possible crisis management operations in other areas as well. Furthermore, this could include the question of establishing a joint early warning and protection system for the entire European continent from the threat of missile attack, something that will require cooperation with NATO as a whole, and not just with the United States. Another field of collaboration is the fight against piracy. Looking to the future, there are several promising possibilities of joint action of naval forces in order to ensure stability in various areas of the oceans.

(3) **The European Union**, after all the twists and turns of its internal development, is gradually becoming a more a visible actor in the international arena. Slowly but steadily it is acquiring crisis management capabilities

The significance of the EU as an element of Euro-Atlantic security will depend on three variables.

- First, on the extent and effectiveness of the “European Security and Defense Policy” (ESDP), and the willingness of participants to invest political capital and resources in this initiative.
- Second, on support from the United States in this regard and the ability to build a balanced mechanism of interaction between the EU and NATO.

- Third, on the nature of the general political relationship between Russia and the EU. Some contentious issues, such as those surrounding the EU's "Eastern Partnership," could have an "inhibitory" effect.

In general, the EU considers Russia a significant partner in preventing and dealing with emergency situations, in the field of space research, and in transport aviation. An important precedent has been the participation by Russians in the EU's operation in Chad. An element of Euro-Atlantic cooperation could also be more regular contact by various ESDP agencies with their counterparts from non-EU countries, including Russia. For example, in parallel with regularly updated ESDP catalogues on existing military capabilities intended for rapid response operations Russia could provide similar information on its own operational resources available for use in joint operations.

(4) The involvement of the *Council of Europe* in the set of international agencies that bear primary responsibility for maintaining Euro-Atlantic security is undoubtedly positive. It provides standards and a review process helping to ensure that member states meet the highest standards of pluralist democracy.

But this does give rise to a conflict in relations with those parties (or candidates for accession to the Council of Europe), where there are certain problems in this field. This has happened more than once in the case of Russia. Russian political circles have often reproached the Council of Europe for its unacceptable interference in domestic affairs, practicing double standards, the prevailing "anti-Russian" decisions in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), etc. Those among the political elite who share this negative view of the Council of Europe insist that the organization's "value" for Russia is not so great, because the problems that preoccupy Russia most (ensuring military security, conflict prevention and resolution, economic cooperation) are not within the purview of the organization. Therefore, if necessary, Russia could painlessly put an end to relations with it in the event that it takes decisions unacceptable to Russia (on Georgia, elections, democratic procedures, etc.).

Officially the Russian government strongly rejects such populist, xenophobic sentiments. It is important, therefore, that the unwillingness to yield to these sentiments not become a victim of potential opportunistic considerations and emotions. If official policy remains as it is, then the role of the Council of Europe as part of Euro-Atlantic security will remain important, as well as somehow unique.

- It is the only organization that existed previously in the western part of the continent that has acquired a truly pan-European character after the end of the Cold War, and in which Russia is involved as a full member. For Russia itself, this underscores a possibility of participating on a non-discriminatory basis in a Euro-Atlantic agency.
- Together with the OSCE, the Council of Europe should play a leading role in promoting such basic elements of Euro-Atlantic security as democracy, political pluralism, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the development of civil society.

- Some aspects of the Council of Europe’s activities relate directly to strengthening security and should be supported in every way. An example is the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, which came into force in 2007.
- The Council of Europe could play an important informational and lobbying role in minimizing some of the problems that may produce destabilizing effects, such as the failure to respect the rights of national minorities, discriminatory court decisions, etc.

(5) In the Euro-Atlantic region other organizations promoting multilateral cooperation on security issues have also emerged in the area of the former Soviet Union. The main ones are the *Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)* and the *Organization of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)*.

For several reasons the CIS retains genuine significance for Russia, including its utility in defending its foreign policy interests. This organization’s effectiveness is low, however, and its involvement in solving questions related to security in the Euro-Atlantic region seems unlikely. Therefore a minimalist approach seems appropriate here. The most likely would be to indicate the presence of the CIS (at least in general terms) in documents, decisions, and mechanisms devoted to strengthening security in the entire post-Soviet space (excluding the Baltics). In particular, this may be politically expedient in order to balance the involvement in the region of other multilateral institutions (primarily the EU and NATO).

With regard to the CSTO, it can currently be seen as an *emerging* security organization. Organizationally it, in reality, falls into three independent segments: Russia-Belarus, Russia-Armenia and Russia-Central Asian countries. Fundamentally they are united only by the unarguably central position of Russia in the organization as well as Moscow’s key role in helping partners to ensure their security.

The recent “adjustment” of the CSTO is aimed at combining two functions: countering traditional external military threats (the establishment of a military alliance, the coordination and integration of the military infrastructures of the seven member countries),³ on the one hand, while also countering new threats and challenges on the other (fighting drug trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism, etc.)⁴. Thus, this organization could

³ Participants have agreed to establish a collective rapid reaction force (RRF), organize its intensified combat training, and equip it with modern weapons and combat equipment. They envisage the establishment of a joint air defense system, a joint system to identify risks posed by chemical and biological weapons. Military-technical cooperation has been stepped up. Coordination of national scientific research and experimental construction work in the military sphere is envisaged, as well as the organization and financing of the joint development of weapons and military equipment. A system of joint training of military personnel has been established.

⁴ The CSTO is carrying out a conceptual study of issues of joint peacekeeping; significant efforts are being made to organize counter-terrorist activity (information exchange, joint exercises, etc.). One of the CSTO’s major tasks is the fight against drug trafficking (half of its member states are located on the main drug transportation route, mostly from Afghanistan). This is closely linked to joint action on border control and

become an element of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture for a number of reasons.

- The CSTO is the only multilateral organization in the post-Soviet space that is capable of carrying out military operations.
- In this capacity, it can be used both independently and as a partner (or counterpart) to the EU, NATO or OSCE.
- Its role may become crucial in suppressing drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe.
- The CSTO's focus on a number of "new threats" (drug trafficking, terrorism) can be interpreted as a move beyond traditionalist approaches to security.

Russia has an interest in advancing the CSTO as a member of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Therefore it should work on minimizing the circumstances that prevent this.

- It is important not to fuel the perception of the CSTO as primarily a tool of Moscow or that Russian authorities seek to use this organization to twist the arm of Russia's "junior partners," say, to generate anti-American actions or to pressure their recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia).
- Another image that works against the CSTO is that its members understand strengthening security and combating terrorism only as a means of ensuring that undemocratic regimes can stay in power. It is impossible to directly refute such a perception, but it can be mitigated: for example, by ensuring greater transparency around the CSTO, expanding media coverage of its activities and promoting its interaction with non-governmental organizations.
- NATO and the EU will only be interested in the CSTO as a partner if it has concrete functions in the military sphere. These, for instance, could include logistical support for NATO air operations in Afghanistan or land-based military transit.

(6) In the Euro-Atlantic space there are numerous *organizations for the development of subregional cooperation*. Traditional military aspects of security rarely appear in their sphere of operation (except for co-operation among South-Eastern European countries on implementing agreed measures on arms limitation and reduction, and the application of confidence-building measures). But if we apply a broader interpretation of security, it is important not to underestimate the role of subregional organizations. Their very existence is a consolidating and stabilizing factor in the international political landscape of the Euro-Atlantic region.

This is important primarily for maintaining security in areas where there are or may be tensions (Caucasus and the Balkans). In this sense, for example, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation "works" to strengthen political stability. We can assume that the activities of some sub-regional organizations (*e.g.*, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council) will almost

curbing illegal migration (in the Central Asian region).

certainly be affected in the most direct way by potentially destabilizing situations in the region of their activity, and they are already acting to reduce tensions in these cases.

(7) In Russia's approach to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, the idea of drafting and signing a *European Security Treaty* is central. The draft Russia has proposed for discussion has so far met with a rather restrained response, although it will probably be the subject of greater attention over time.

The proposed treaty, however, would not be enough to alter qualitatively the Euro-Atlantic security picture. In a broader sense, it would be wrong to reduce the task simply to signing the European Security Treaty.

- If there is a politically motivated desire to sign it in the near future, the document will be limited to a number of a few undisputed clauses. Whereas preparing a *meaningful* treaty to address really serious security-related conflicts will require much more time and effort than were needed to draft the Helsinki Final Act in 1973-1975.
- The range of problems that deserve attention in the context of ensuring Euro-Atlantic security is much broader than can be touched on in a single treaty instrument, even if the latter addresses the most fundamental issues. While focusing the main effort upon drafting it, too many other important issues will be put aside for a long time.
- Having set the goal of reaching legally binding language, it is all too easy to make the treaty a victim of abstract dogmatism. There are many aspects of Euro-Atlantic security in respect of which such phrasings are not possible or are not of prime importance.
- Work on the treaty will remain deadlocked if of the sides insist on solving problems that are insoluble. Conceptually difficult problems (*e.g.*, the definition of what is meant by "not damaging the security of other countries") deserve serious professional and political debate--but not in the context of a treaty.
- Ensuring security in the European (or Euro-Atlantic) region is a multi-dimensional and multi-layered problem whose solution will require a variety of institutional and international legal instruments. Trying to "incorporate" them all into a single document is unwise and counterproductive.

It is worth viewing the formation of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture as a broad and multi-faceted project that affects various aspects of the situation in the region and beyond. The ultimate purpose of this undertaking is to ensure stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to solve security-related issues that arise in it through joint efforts of the countries of the region.

The drafting and signing of the European Security Treaty is only one part of this project. While it may be central and pivotal, it is not the only one. Within the "big project" it is important to initiate and promote a number of parallel processes, focused on the development or renewal of various types of structural security elements in the Euro-

Atlantic space.

In essence an entire network of treaty instruments needs to be developed for governance and joint actions based on territorial principles and/or a problem areas approach.⁵ Some of these instruments may be created within the framework of existing multilateral agencies or in conjunction with them; others may emerge as institutions are reformed (or, conversely, stimulate their reform), while others may appear independently.

The network could, for example, include treaties or agreements on peacekeeping operations, combating terrorism, energy security (effectively an updated Treaty on Energy Charter), countering cross-border criminal activities, security and cooperation in the Arctic, the suppression of piracy, and so on. They are unlikely to have a uniform character and will not fall under a set of common standards (either in structure or in participants), but in the aggregate they would create a true fabric of Euro-Atlantic security. This approach could be defined as a “variable geometry model of Euro-Atlantic security.”

The next two sections discuss, in general terms, several key areas where such a model might apply. One entails traditional aspects of ensuring security, while the other focuses on so-called “new challenges.”

6. TRADITIONAL SECURITY AREAS

Ensuring security in the Euro-Atlantic region has a number of traditional aspects. They are traditional because they involve primarily the military-political dimension of the security spectrum. The experience gained here over many years remains relevant and should absolutely not be discarded. Non-traditional approaches, however, are also possible and indeed necessary.

(i) *Strategic weapons*. Above all there is a need to resume the forward movement in the limitation of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Further, although the overwhelming majority of European countries have an interest in maintaining and strengthening U.S.-Russia cooperation in this field, it is advisable to establish mechanisms for them to have more active involvement in this process, if not as direct participants, then as interested partners of Russia and the United States. Exchanging information and holding consultations with them will increase mutual trust within the Euro-Atlantic space, as well as within NATO itself. The involvement of Europeans is also important in the context of a more distant future, when the issue arises of bringing “third nuclear countries” into U.S.-Russia talks.

(ii) *Missile Defense Systems*. In trying to find a solution to the problems of missile defense it is important to bear in mind the Euro-Atlantic dimension. Even if most possible compromises depend primarily upon Moscow and Washington reaching an agreement, the

⁵ Variations on this theme are contained in a number of publications and reports on approaches to Euro-Atlantic security. See, for example, *Euro-Atlantic security architecture*. Ed. by I.Yu.Yurgens, A.A.Dynkin, V.G.Baranovsky. Moscow.: Econ-Inform, 2009; *Towards a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture*. Report to the European section of the Valdai Discussion Club Conference (London, 8-10 December 2009). Authors: S.A.Karaganov, T.Bordachev. Moscow, November 2009.

inclusion of European countries should be encouraged.

This issue had already arisen in the recent past. For example, when considering the presence of Russian observers at the planned deployment sites of the U.S. missile defense system elements in Poland and the Czech Republic, the non-deployment of ABMs in base silos for a period of time, and the make-up of an expert committee to clarify the nature of the external threat. Amid the range of constructive proposals focused on joint actions to neutralize a possible missile threat, the participation of European countries is particularly important, including the joint use of radar, creating a data exchange center, and the like.

In the maximalist version of this approach—that is, the creation of a joint missile defense system intended to protect the whole of Europe from the threat of missile attack—the partnership must be trilateral (U.S. + Russia + NATO and/or the EU).

(iii) *The CFE Treaty*. Overly zealous critics of the CFE have promoted the idea that this treaty was “outdated even at the time of signing.” This ignores the fact that the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty signed in 1999 removed the obligation to maintain an inter-bloc balance, instead replacing this with a non-bloc approach, and, hence, gave it a Euro-Atlantic character.

That said, the current situation does not meet the imperatives of strengthening Euro-Atlantic security. A legal vacuum has arisen in which a key element in the system of measures to prevent a military-political confrontation is missing. Not only has Russia suspended the CFE Treaty, but Western countries have also pushed this problem to the background, seeing little promise of progress. The South Ossetia War of 2008, Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and development of major new military bases there have brought the situation to a standstill.

Unfortunately a number of the solutions for helping resolve the situation proposed by the expert community seem unpromising or even counterproductive.⁶ The following steps, however, might help to break the deadlock.

- Return to a regime of transparency and comprehensive monitoring of the CFE Treaty, leaving the subject of its ratification and improvement to the more distant future.⁷
- Raise the question of extending such a regime (even without the formal establishment of weapons quotas) to countries outside the CFE Treaty zone (including the Baltic States).

⁶ This applies in particular to raising the question of ratifying the CFE Treaty in today’s environment, adding additional conditions to “return” Russia to the treaty, the need to overcome the imbalance in the size of the armed forces and conventional weapons of Russia (in its European part) and NATO.

⁷ Such an initiative is (i) easily achievable (because it does not require negotiation and can simply be announced unilaterally by stakeholders); (ii) legally permissible (since the formal treaty is valid, and even Russia did not cease to be a member of it); (iii) politically reversible (and in this regard does not cause anxiety to anyone), (iv) would be highly regarded in Europe as a politically significant gesture.

- Given the current situation in the Caucasus, temporarily withdraw this area from the regime of restrictions under the CFE Treaty, with the understanding that the issue requires a more thorough discussion and agreement in the context of a political settlement⁸.
- Plan to conduct negotiations in the foreseeable future aimed at concluding a CFE-2, with a wider range of participants, deeper reductions in armed forces and armaments, and a higher level of transparency.

(iv) **Tactical nuclear weapons.** Both Russia and the U.S. are most reluctant to include tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the sphere of arms control. For Russia they are a tool with which to neutralize the superiority of NATO's conventional forces, especially in the light of the alliance possibly expanding further eastward. The United States has traditionally sought to maintain its nuclear forces with a forward deployment in Europe (400-500 tactical nuclear airborne bombs for fighter-bombers) as an additional military advantage.

However, the revival of nuclear disarmament and arms control raises the issue of TNW. It is even more important to bear in mind that this question is of particular significance in the Euro-Atlantic context. Any serious discussion of forming a Euro-Atlantic security space cannot ignore the presence of hundreds and thousands of nuclear warheads designed not for deterrence, but for combat use in this very space.

In practical terms, the most difficult problem arising from TNW relates to monitoring. In the case of strategic weapons this is performed by the monitoring of carriers, but this is not possible with tactical nuclear weapons, because they are deployed on dual-purpose carriers. One would have to monitor at a deep and intrusive level by inspecting containers with bombs and warheads in storage, opening up access to facilities that are the most sensitive in terms of military security, something unlikely to be acceptable to many for reasons of secrecy.

A possible solution is to agree, as a first step, to move all tactical nuclear weapons from forward bases deep inside countries to centralized storage facilities. The withdrawal of all and not just some tactical nuclear weapons is expedient for monitoring reasons: it is easier to implement and would be more acceptable in terms of maintaining secrecy, requiring only that the complete absence of warheads in storage facilities whose location and characteristics are well known be determined. Transferring TNW to centralized stockpiles would remove them from forward positions and also ensure greater safety from the threat of their seizure by terrorists, unauthorized movement or even use.

The United States would be required to withdraw its 400-500 airborne bombs from six

⁸ Additional arguments in favor of this "special treatment" regarding treaty limitations can be drawn from references to experiences relating to two other regions: (i) the Baltic states, a region in which there are no restrictions; (ii) the countries of South-Eastern Europe, a region in which special arms limitation measures have been implemented.

European countries. Russia, for its part, would need to relocate about two or three thousand tactical nuclear weapons (bombs and warheads) from air force and naval bases on its territory to centralized storage facilities. The tactical nuclear weapons would be able to be swiftly returned to the armed forces in the event of a security threat.

While implementing this approach would require difficult decisions on the part of the U.S. and Russian military, in Europe such a step would be well-received and would reinforce its sense of security. Overall the proposed approach would enable a more thorough shift of perspective on the question of ensuring security within a Euro-Atlantic framework.

(v) *Measures of trust, security and restraint in the military field.* These have been developed on the European continent for over thirty years, mainly through the OSCE. The list is very impressive, although not well known among the wider public. It includes information exchange, consultation on unusual military activities and incidents, notifications, restrictive measures, air observation in “open skies” mode, and inspections. The main result is that the military activities of states have become more transparent and less unpredictable. Government can now be more confident that other countries are not carrying out covert military activity.

But there have also been instances in which the application of confidence-building measures has broken down, as happened just prior to the conflict in the Caucasus in summer 2008. Moreover, existing arrangements do not cover all militarily significant activities at a sub-regional level. Nor do they cover some new forms of military activity.

Problems also arise that require discussion and negotiation. U.S. plans to create light bases in Romania and Bulgaria prompted the need to clarify and define “substantial combat forces” as specified in the treaty. NATO had previously intended to refrain from additional permanent stationing. Russia also had pledged not to deploy “substantial combat forces,” in particular, in the Kaliningrad region, and there may be a tradeoff to be arranged along these lines.

To give further impetus to the formation of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture, it would be logical:

- to update the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures now ten years old;
- to undertake more widely unilateral steps (to provide information, to show military restraint on the deployment of forces and hardware, etc.);
- to announce jointly or individually a decision to adhere to the regime of transparency established by the CFE Treaty.

(vi) *Non-proliferation.* The goals of building a Euro-Atlantic security architecture makes imperative joint actions in this area, despite minor differences in the approaches of Russia, the United States, the EU, and NATO. Such actions could be undertaken on several fronts.

- Develop a joint platform for Euro-Atlantic countries on non-proliferation, which would include all the main ideas contained in the relevant documents of NATO, the EU (where this subject is treated more thoroughly), and other organizations and individual countries in the region.
- Emphasize the theme of working to expand the zones free of nuclear weapons in the areas adjacent to the Euro-Atlantic region. These may include North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
- Coordinate and harmonize the efforts of Euro-Atlantic countries at various international forums to strengthen the international legal regime for nuclear non-proliferation. A particular emphasis could be placed on strengthening the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including in the context of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Joint proposals could be drafted on strengthening the regime established by this treaty to close potential loopholes that might be used by states planning nuclear weapons programs.
- Promote jointly the development of multilateral inter-state models to organize the nuclear fuel cycle aimed at excluding the possibility of using the latter to develop nuclear weapons. The ideas proposed on this topic by Russia, Germany, the United States, other countries, and the IAEA complement each other to a large extent. In the Euro-Atlantic context it would be valuable to make an inventory of relevant initiatives and agree on their support.

Iran's nuclear program represents a special dimension of the Euro-Atlantic countries' non-proliferation policy line. Their potential for harmonizing individual concerns and political preferences of each other is far from exhausted. Indeed, the prospects for settling this problem may well be determined by the ability (or inability) of Euro-Atlantic countries to agree on a common approach.

(vii) *International peacekeeping*. One of the most notable phenomena in contemporary world politics is international peacekeeping. This includes not only UN activities, but the broader practice of external intervention, including the use of force, in conflicts. This is typically carried out by various regional organizations, but sometimes by individual states or *ad hoc* coalitions.

The countries of the Euro-Atlantic region are actively involved in such practices, both individually and collectively. NATO, the EU, and the CSTO are creating tools of intervention and seeking to test them, as well as developing new tools for the future. Meanwhile, significant contradictions have emerged in the principles and practice of the external use of military force in the approaches of Russia and other countries, primarily the United States. These contradictions involve the objectives, nature and legitimacy of such intervention.

It is important that the interaction of Russia and Western countries with regard to issues of international peacekeeping take a cooperative rather than competitive, much less confrontational, course. All parties need to seek joint or mutually acceptable formulas when intervening with the use of military force. And, if the same conflicts become the focus of

attention of both Russia and Western countries (such as in the South Caucasus, Moldova, Central Asia), their collaboration may be especially necessary, down to the coordination of peacekeeping operations.

Perhaps it is time to consider a general peacekeeping mechanism as a tool for ensuring security in Europe and in some instances outside Europe. Movement in this direction seems possible. Despite Russia-NATO differences, their collaboration on peacekeeping in conflict areas seems quite probable in the medium term. During the crises in former Yugoslavia, Russia and NATO gained some experience in joint peacekeeping work in field conditions. Moreover, the Russia-NATO Council has been developing the concept of joint Russia-NATO peacekeeping operations, which was the result of three years of consultations by a specially created working group. Unfortunately, this document has not been tabled and remains unavailable to the public, but it may prove useful in new circumstances were progress toward the formation of a Euro-Atlantic security system to advance.

To promote Euro-Atlantic goals in peacekeeping a number of interrelated tasks should be resolved:

- Establish a system of monitoring emerging conflicts and preventive action;
- Implement effective international mediation;
- Build a mechanism for political decision-making on intervention in conflicts (which is necessary to give the action legitimacy);
- Ensure the establishment and maintenance of an array of intervention resources (from humanitarian assistance to military force);
- Plan measures for post-conflict rehabilitation, stabilization, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction of normal life in conflict regions.

It is not certain that all these problems can be solved with the help of and within the framework of a single organizational format. Rather, it should be assumed that crisis response and conflict settlement systems in the Euro-Atlantic region may need to be separated. They might include existing international organizations and elements, and distribute and coordinate functions between them. But in a situation where in the same geopolitical space several regional organizations operate-some of which have a history of competing with each other-it seems reasonable that the UN should act as a key umbrella organization coordinating any peacekeeping mechanism.

With regard to the OSCE, its peacekeeping potential is significant, but in practice it remains largely immobilized. To use this potential, the OSCE itself must find its second wind, in particular, by enhancing the mechanisms of its first “basket” dealing with political-military and disarmament issues. This could be implemented within an “ OSCE-2” or “OSCE+” formulae.

There are three models of possible reform of conflict resolution and crisis response

mechanisms within an improved architecture of Euro-atlantic security.⁹

- ***A joint conflict monitoring model.*** At its core the model requires that observers from the major organizations working in the field of security in the Euro-Atlantic area be placed in zones of regional conflicts. This should be carried out by unanimous agreement on the basis of an overall coordinated UN mandate. As a result one could expect less inconsistencies and uncoordinated efforts when attempting to resolve conflicts. Follow-up actions would then be taken by each international organization independently, based on its own specific procedures, mandates, and mechanisms.

This is a “weakened” version of a joint approach to crisis response. Its advantage lies in the ability to use it relatively quickly and without additional bureaucratic, political, and financial input.

- ***A “Russia-U.S.-EU model”.*** The model assumes clearly delineated spheres of interests and areas of responsibility, but also involves joint rather than competitive action on the part of participants. This will require overcoming serious political and psychological barriers and stereotypes both by the West and Russia.

A major limitation of this option in security architecture is the lack of interest and possible passive resistance from the objects of peacekeeping activity. For example, a number of states in the post-Soviet space may prefer tension between the three centers of power, which gives them more room to maneuver (a “multi-vector policy”), and allows them to play on the tensions between Russia, the United States, and the EU.

- ***An “OSCE-2” model.*** This involves reformatting the roles and functions of existing institutions and security mechanisms, the creation of more coordinated mechanisms for regional-scale conflicts, not only at the level of observers, but also in terms of decision-making and practical actions by regional powers. The upgrade would raise the salience of the first “basket” of the OSCE, or even use it as a basis for building an independent regional mechanism for crisis response and conflict resolution, one with universal representation of all countries in the region.

7. IN SEARCH OF ANSWERS TO “NEW CHALLENGES”

The countries of the Euro-Atlantic region have an objective interest and significant opportunities for joint counteraction to so-called “new challenges” to security. A generally accepted list of “new challenges” does not exist, but the following almost certainly belong to it:

- drug trafficking;

⁹ These models have been proposed by Alexander Nikitin, in: *Euro-Atlantic security architecture*. Ed. by I.Yu.Yurgens, A.A.Dynkin, V.G.Baranovsky. Moscow.: Econ-Inform, 2009; p.82-88.

- terrorism;
- threats to biosecurity;
- epidemics and pandemics;
- emergencies and disasters;
- environmental challenges;
- climate change;
- illegal migration;
- transnational crime;
- maritime piracy;
- corruption;
- financial and economic manipulation;
- failures in resource supply (especially energy);
- etc.

The list is only approximate: it is not intended to be systematic or exhaustive. There is no shortage of arguments for including many additional points (*e.g.*, computer security or challenges related to separatism, tensions on ethnic and religious grounds, linguistic and cultural identity, etc.).

Some criteria that separate “new challenges” from traditional security threats fluctuate. In terms of combating terrorism, for example, the use of military force may be as relevant as in repelling aggression. “Dual use” military hardware may also be necessary in fighting piracy.

For many countries the significance of various “new challenges” is not the same; moreover, it may change over time. With respect to some problems, an increased level of hypersensitivity is characteristic of most countries in the Euro-Atlantic region. One example is the issue of energy security.

Some challenges may affect individual countries or groups of countries to a greater extent than others. The “war on terror” in the United States, for example, has at times taken on exaggerated forms, which is understandable in light of the shock from the September 11, 2001 attack. In Europe the problem of terrorism has traditionally been more acute for the United Kingdom, Spain, and France.

All the “new challenges” are fundamentally transnational. For this reason, there is broad recognition of the need for the most energetic mobilization of resources for international cooperation, whether by using the organizational base of existing multilateral institutions, by converting some of their mechanisms, or by creating new institutions.

An approach to international cooperation in this area is relatively less politicized than in

countering military security challenges. But a political decision to initiate cooperation or to increase it will not alone suffice. Much is determined by the specifics of the problematic area in question and the specific forms of cooperation necessary to respond.

All of the above can be applied to the problem area of “new Challenges for Euro-Atlantic security”. However, this should only be done with a number of clarifications.

The sensitivity of the Euro-Atlantic region to the “new challenges” in the most general terms is due to its relatively higher levels of social development. This creates its vulnerability, but at the same time its predisposition to a joint response. Such a response, of course, may arise in a wider format including other interested states. But the greater resources and political potential of the Euro-Atlantic countries plus the existence of a developed institutional infrastructure in the region increase the probability of a Euro-Atlantic response to new challenges.

However, when considering the major multilateral institutions operating in the Euro-Atlantic region, there is not only no unity among and within them when addressing non-traditional security threats, but sometimes fundamental differences are apparent. At the same time existing institutional mechanisms often only serve as a basis for multilateral dialogue, which may ensure a certain level of pluralism, but also hinders the development of effective ways of preventing and responding to these threats.

Hence the emergence of situations where inter-country cooperation is easier to achieve in a bilateral format than with a broader range of participants, much less with the full complement of Euro-Atlantic countries. Another factor also plays a part: on some delicate, politically sensitive issues, information exchange and, more so, joint actions presuppose a relationship of trust between the parties, a less likely prospect in multilateral configurations. So, for example, in the fight against terrorism or countering criminal activity, concrete cooperation is more efficiently pursued on a bilateral basis.

Further, the fact remains that within the “Euro-Atlantic triangle”-the United States, Europe, and Russia-the degree of interaction between the three poles is not the same. The first two have historically, politically, and economically closer ties, and often it is simply a matter of adding Russia. But this scenario gives rise to two types of problems.

One might appear on the part of Russia. The syndrome of wounded pride might generate political and psychological cautiousness of both authorities and public opinion, as well as make the ideologically motivated opposition by anti-Western forces stronger. For their part, the EU or NATO have to reckon with the fact that both of these organizations are not optimally configured for co-operation with third countries when dealing with the “new challenges” to security. The EU- because of the nature of its bureaucratic process, NATO-due to its continued focus on primarily military issues.

One way or another, more political energy is required to include Russia, and this is not always in evidence. And without Russia’s inclusion the Euro-Atlantic configuration will remain unfinished and imperfect.

At the same time, the formation of this configuration in a truncated form can also occur through the development of more intensive engagement between Russia and the EU. It is wrong to always see this as concealing a malicious desire to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States by setting one against another. The causes may be entirely benign.

- Institutionalizing relations between Russia and the EU or the intention to renew them, say, in preparing a new agreement (treaty) on partnership and cooperation, pursuing “roadmaps” for cooperation, and such, have their own separate justification.
- Territorial proximity also plays a role. For example, when developing cooperation in preventing and eliminating of the consequences of natural and man-made disasters, or providing emergency humanitarian assistance geography matters. Similarly, the formation of a “pan-European environmental space” seems more realistic than the idea of advancing it in a broader Euro-Atlantic framework.
- In some areas the format of cooperation is predetermined by the very nature of the “new challenges.” For example, there is a closer similarity between Russia and EU countries on issues related to international migration than either with the United States, which means there are more possibilities to expand their understanding and build cooperation.

Sometimes, however, a paradoxical asymmetry occurs. Drug trafficking, for example, is a threat common to Russia and other European countries. Unlike the United States, the target of drugs principally from Latin America, European countries are among the major consumers of opiates originating in Afghanistan, while Russia is a transit country for them, but also increasingly a major consumer. Russia and other European countries confront as well the challenge from the production, trade and consumption of synthetic drugs, and illegal trafficking of drug precursors. Greater cooperation in this sphere between Russia and other European countries, however, is restricted by the latter’s lack of unified approach to combating drugs. There are also considerable differences in the approaches prevalent in the EU (where drugs are treated mainly as a health and law enforcement issue) and Russia (where they are seen as a national security issue). As a result, in fact, Russian-European cooperation in combating drug trafficking is not yet at the level of practical cooperation between Russia and the United States. Bringing this cooperation into the Euro-Atlantic sphere would help to address this imbalance.

The need for a rapid response to and cooperation in preventing and countering transnational non-traditional threats is sometimes sufficiently acute to overcome the political or institutional obstacles. Thus, despite delays in cooperation between Russia and Western countries through the EU, the OSCE, not to mention NATO, there is a *de facto* formation of individual elements (for now these are no more than a mosaic of fragments) of the desired Euro-Atlantic system.

Thus, the long-standing problem of creating a European center for disaster management is still not resolved, but individual elements of this system are being implemented on an *ad hoc* basis by cooperation with individual countries and groups of countries most interested in such cooperation. An example is the imminent creation of a permanent European base

for a squadron of amphibious aircraft of the Russian Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Management (MES) for fighting regular forest fires in Europe. In future it could be used to increase effective interaction with the EU Commission in providing emergency humanitarian assistance, as well as serving as a basis for establishing a European squadron for joint response to emergencies, something long been proposed by Russia's MES.

It is important that the tactic of "small steps" be inscribed into a more general strategy. In this particular case it should be a strategy aimed at creating a system of mutual aid in crisis situations, including joint mechanisms to assess, prevent and reduce risks of natural disasters, rapid information sharing, and coordinated action by teams specially trained to work in crisis situations, the exchange of risk management experience in land use planning, hydro construction, and the development of urban areas.

Among the issues usually associated with "new challenges", the most difficult for countries in the Euro-Atlantic region is currently *energy security*. This is for several reasons. The problem is complex and has various aspects-economic, political, technological, environmental, among others. It is of vital importance for many of the region's countries. At the same time it brings together countries with diametrically opposed interests and vulnerabilities: reducing the interests of suppliers, transit countries and consumers to a common denominator is extremely difficult. Further, a thorough solution to the problem will require huge investment, which in turn requires appropriate political conditions over the long term.

Many of these parameters in the Euro-Atlantic region are subject to different kinds of uncertainty, some critical to Russia, but also affecting, sometimes painfully, many others. Moreover, conflict and even crisis situations have arisen, sometimes exacerbated by the general political context, such as when gas transiting from Russia to Europe via Ukraine was cut off. To date these cases have been settled mainly on an *ad hoc* basis. There is currently no prospect of a global solution package, although presumably such an approach should be possible. For this to happen, however, a very wide range of issues would need to be addressed. Among them are:

- general benchmarks and goals;
- the possibility of asset swapping;
- the configuration of pipelines and power lines;
- transparency of agreements and verifiability of their implementation;
- conditions for attracting and guaranteeing investments;
- the interaction of national regulators or creation of a European-level regulator;
- interaction with countries and other parties outside the region;
- a strategy for the development of alternative energy sources.

In general, with respect to any of the "new challenges", the establishment of Euro-Atlantic

cooperation requires significant and painstaking political and organizational work. Nonetheless efforts made in this area, if serious and sustained, hold open the prospect of significantly strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

On Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

The EASI project, launched by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is implemented by the group of prominent politicians and experts from Russia, the USA and Europe with the goal to elaborate proposals on the new Euro-Atlantic security structure.

The EASI Commission co-chairmen are: former Senator Sam Nunn for the USA, former German Deputy Foreign Minister Wolfgang Ischinger for Europe, and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov for Russia. IMEMO is the key partner of the project in Russia. All participants in the project see the solution of the problems not through the prism of Russian-Western relations, but in the context of common threats to security. Such an approach effectively promotes the Russian vision of all-European security. The President of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized as expedient the EASI project and Russia's active participation in it.