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RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES**

**STRATEGIC VALUES
AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE
OF EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY**

**Situation Analysis Findings
within the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative**

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The collection “Strategic values and political structure of Euro-Atlantic security” is based on the findings of the situation analysis, organized in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) project. The EASI was launched by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is implemented by the group of prominent politicians and experts from Russia, the USA and Europe with the goal to elaborate proposals on the new Euro-Atlantic security structure. IMEMO is the key partner of the project in Russia. All participants of the project see the solution of the problems not through the prism of Russian-Western relations, but in the context of common threats to the security. Such an approach serves for more effective promotion of Russian vision of all-European security. The EASI project and Russian active participation in it were recognized as expedient by the President of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This collection continues the series of publications under IMEMO and EASI aegis in Russia. It contains the analysis of the conceptual, ideological and political aspects of the notion of Euro-Atlantic security, the options for joint actions, as well as institutional, management and legal characteristics of the Euro-Atlantic security structure.

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Strategic Values and Political Structure of Euro-Atlantic Security. Problem Definition and Discussion Brief

The situational analysis, as part of “Strategic Values and Political Structure of Euro-Atlantic Security” by IMEMO RAN, launched a series of discussions over Euro-Atlantic security problems within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) project in Russia.

The tripartite format of the EASI project (USA-Europe (EU) – Russia) preset the theme of the first situational analysis. Even as the EASI Commission began its first meeting, it acknowledged the necessity to specify the basic notions, concepts, and theoretical and methodological points which immediately came to the forefront. Its members engaging in practical activity saw the urgency – as did the scientists -- to work out a common conceptual body and a common language. The well-known dictum – “there’s nothing more practical than a good theory” – has again proven its relevance.

Secondly, the project is aimed at working out a vision of Euro-Atlantic security, common to all the three parties, as well as proper recommendations, but these efforts are hampered by the negative experience of the “Cold War” era and serious miscalculations in the past two decades. Ideally, the new European Security system should be based on the principles of effective cooperation, rule out the possibility to apply double standards, and, at the very least, resolve common security problems without contradicting the basic security interests of its participants.

On the strength of the above premises, the organizers made the most difficult fundamental issues the key themes of the first situational analysis, focusing on the search for the common approaches to Euro-Atlantic security problems, acceptable to all the three parties. There are four themes:

1. Forming a positive agenda, i.e. a tentative standard approach;
2. Ideology: basic values, common goals, consolidation;
3. New paradigm of joint actions;
4. Global governance, governing the international political system; the role of the Euro-Atlantic region.

Experts were invited to answer the following questions:

- Are there alternatives to a positive agenda?
- What is the optimal positioning of Russia in Euro-Atlantic security: should it be complete or partial integration in security associations, or independent positioning with possible participation or non-participation in joint actions and decision-making?
- Is Russia capable of maintaining national security outside of the “joint actions” strategy?
- What are the key priorities of a positive agenda?
- How relevant is ideology for Russia in forming the European security structure, or should it focus on common interests and goals instead?

- Which is a more effective “locomotive” for joint actions: peacekeeping operations, the joint missile defense project, or strengthening of arms control regime?
- Should the notion “humanitarian security” gain prominence within the policy of “joint actions?”
- In what regions (outside of the Euro-Atlantic region) and in what formats are “joint actions” possible?
- What is the condition and role of the existing global governance institutions?

In reviewing the issues related to Russian specifics, experts paid special attention to the balance between the modernization (development) agenda and the security agenda, as well as to ideological considerations and value approaches to security problems.

Prof. Andrey Zagorsky, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Russian Foreign Ministry, prepared theses for the first discussion, titled “Conceptual Approach: Forming a Positive Agenda.” In his opinion, the risks related to hard security are low-key in the Euro-Atlantic space at present, so it should focus on the new threats emerging beyond its boundaries. Defining the most promising guidelines for cooperation between Russia, European countries, and the USA, Zagorsky named such projects as partnership for modernization, joint missile defense, inter-operability within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, stabilizing Afghanistan and strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Prof Vladimir Kantor, Department of Philosophy, State University – Higher School of Economics, called the proposed concept “soberly optimistic.” However, Kantor noted the significance of Europe’s heterogeneity and that Russians should perhaps become Russian Europeans, as French or American Europeans exist. He also pointed out at the significance of cultural differences and demographic problems, and the fragility of an anthropogenic civilization.

In the course of the discussion, the thesis on divisibility of security was tested as “intellectual provocation,” together with the proposal to limit the notion of Euro-Atlantic security by taking out Central Asia and the Caucasus from it. The participants in the situational analysis had misgivings about the prospects for and the feasibility of such an approach.

An alternative to the positive agenda is a negative one, where Russia, reveling in its specialty, remains on the sidelines of world development. When reviewing “the positive agenda” – which implies Russia’s stepping up cooperation with the West – it should be borne in mind that it does not have unanimous support in Russia. The advocates of neo-imperial ideology object to the European way. They support the project of authoritarian modernization, which, as mostly experts agree, is not feasible in Russia. With uncertainties over the strategic choice, Russia will only be able to cooperate with the West in a few fields, such as the situation in Afghanistan.

It has been underlined that everybody is interested in finding new opportunities for cooperation, beginning from Russia’s top leadership. “A positive agenda” was taking shape as early as in the 2000s, as Russia and NATO set up a joint council and Russia and the EU launched a dialogue on common spaces, but the parties then backtracked. Aside from the “positive” and “negative” agendas, the participants in the discussion pointed out at “a passive agenda.” It envisions waiting for proposals from partners, and is undesirable for Russia. The word “convergence” A.Zagorsky used in his theses to

characterize progressive relations between Russia and the West differs to advantage from the term “integration” which is often resented or misunderstood in Russia.

The participants challenged the thesis that “hard security” has been losing its significance in Europe after military action in Kosovo and Georgia. An opinion was voiced that if modernization was important for Russia, its significance for the USA and the EU was debatable. Hence there are no reasons to consider modernization a promising guideline for international cooperation. Participants also doubted the prospects for joint work on Afghan problems, because the USA and its European allies in the international coalition will try to forget about Afghanistan once they withdraw from that country. Some experts believe that the European Union is not a strategic global player any more. The triangle of such players, together with Russia and the USA, should probably include China, not the EU.

Russia’s efforts in shaping a “positive agenda” might be hampered by internal factors, such as the threat of disintegration, instability in the Caucasus and the anti-Western and anti-U.S. sentiments of the ruling class. Also, progress in a “positive” development of relations with European countries and the USA might require of Russia certain concessions, so it should decide which concessions would be acceptable.

Answering these considerations, author of the theses A.Zagorsky reiterated that in his opinion, Europe was not facing the threat of a large-scale war, while modernization might become a consolidating factor if it led to convergence, i.e. making Russia, European countries and the USA more alike.

In this connection, the participants in the discussion underscored the necessity to tie security with development and try to combine the “agendas” aimed at attaining these two goals.

To draw a joint agenda for security, it was proposed to analyze the participants’ security doctrines within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative and attempt, if not harmonizing them, then grading the challenges. The idea of joint work on air defense, proposed in the theses, met with support as well.

Participants in the discussion backed the proposal to “grade challenges.” They noted the importance of dialogue with NATO over new challenges and the necessity to involve China in cooperation whenever possible. In general, the manifestation of the anti-Chinese vector in the Russian economy would be as dangerous as the emergence of the anti-Western one.

The proposition that G-20 might replace the G-8 came under criticism, as these formats have different specializations, with the G-8 prospects looking far more promising. Drug trafficking was designated as the key problem that stands in the way of more intensive cooperation in the Afghan issue.

Experts largely disagreed with the thesis on “hard security” problems’ gradually losing momentum. They underlined that it was premature to sideline the “hard security” discussion, and called for taking into account the qualitative changes in conventional and nuclear armaments. This issue should be kept on the agenda, presented in a respectful and non-confrontational manner. The significance of ensuring Russia-NATO interoperability was not questioned, but participants called for ruling out the possibility of Russian troops’ taking part in missions without UN mandate.

Fedor Lukyanov prepared the theses for discussion over the second theme: Ideology, Basic Values, Common Goals and Promoting Democracy. In his view, Europe is still

far from understanding the objectives of its movement, while the international organizations in Europe are going through a crisis. The European Union is weakening and Russia has exhausted the potential that secured its development in the past decade, so shaping a truly multi-polar world is fraught with strategic marginalization for both of them. By way of response, Russia and the EU might work out a common geopolitical identity. Lukyanov assumes that Russia's acceptance of "European values," i.e. the principles of modern governance, will be taking place as the active part of the Russian population will realize that they help attain results, so "effectiveness" should become the key notion for Greater Europe.

In comments on the theses, Andrei Ryabov, editor-in-chief of the World Economics and International Relations magazine, pointed out at the fact that values are often an instrument that legitimizes certain practices, so the present-day Russian value model successfully legitimizes stability, but shows a weakness once Russia addresses modernization. Ryabov believes that the dialogue over values is hardly possible in the conditions of grassroots corruption, clientelism and monopolism in Russia.

The discussion over the second theme noted that the ideological and value problem in Russia is that it has not passed through the era of enlightenment, which negatively affected the value reference points of the elite and the society. "Skipping an epoch is impossible."

A number of experts brought forward the thesis that while building the dialogue over values, we should keep it in mind that Atlantism and Liberalism are not one, they have many inherent contradictions in values. Recently, Europe has been edging away from the values of social justice, whereas the USA, on the contrary, has headed for them.

The participants have acknowledged that Russia has not always been anti-Western. In the early 1990s, the sentiment regarding the West was quite different there, and changes occurred due to the West's policy. Specifically, the two value reference points in which Russia and the West differ are "governable democracy" and the exclusiveness of the post-Soviet space.

A number of experts hold that a true security community can only emerge in the event of the profound convergence of values, so if Russia attempts to build such a community solely on the basis of interests -- i.e. while taking into account the real potential and resources -- it will sooner lose than gain.

However, other participants in the discussion disagreed with this opinion. For example, they wondered if Europe should embrace Russian values since the case in point is convergence. They emphasized that Russia is extremely diverse culturally and civilizationally. It is necessary to take into account the position of the Muslim population and conduct dialogue with it, and in this sense, Russia might have suggestions for Europe which has already discussed Euro-Islam. Doubts have been voiced regarding Europe's striving toward unification with Russia and the USA's taking such unification calmly.

In general, the participants questioned the expediency of the active value approach in forming a joint agenda for Euro-Atlantic security. Developing common values should be not so much a pre-requisite as a result of cooperation. The fact that ideology does not stand in the way of US-Chinese cooperation and that cooperation in security should influence the formation of values was cited as an argument. Experts also indicated the

dramatic differences of values in Northern and Southern Europe and between each country.

Some analysts suggested that the existing value gap had been overdramatized. In actual fact, Russia has already joined the value system of a collective West; all the values are spelled out in the international commitments Russia has signed, and they are binding for Russia's partners, too. In certain fields, the difference between Russia and partners are not as big as between the USA and the EU, according to some estimates.

MGIMO Prof Alexander Nikitin wrote the theses for the third theme: New Paradigm: from Peaceful Co-Existence to Joint Actions. He brought forward four guidelines for a possible development of Russia's foreign and security policies: becoming a full-fledged "pole" of world politics; confirming Russia's European orientation and becoming part of "an expanded West," not merging into the "West" but bringing Russia and the West together in a single global "North"; and becoming "an ordinary developed country." In Nikitin's opinion, the globalization of functions and zones of responsibility of the European Union and NATO in security led to erosion of the Euro-Atlantic space. Regional international organizations need talks over the division and mutual complementarity of functions, especially in the settlement of conflicts.

In her comments on the theses, IMEMO RAN leading researcher Irina Kobrinskaya noted that "the ordinary country" option was not possible for Russia whereas turning it into a center of force might become a strategic goal. The reviewer does not think that the re-orientation from the United Nations to the G-8, which Nikitin mentioned within the context of the global "North" scenario is justified. Resisting the erosion of the Euro-Atlantic configuration would be possible by expanding its format to trans-Pacific, which would include East Asia. To neutralize the difference in the approaches by various countries, it was suggested turning to the concept of humanitarian security, and using Academician Yevgeny Primakov's idea about "the shared strategic values": peace, stability, the security of the state and the individual, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such an understanding of values would help remove the ideologizing problem.

In the course of the discussion, a point was made that the stereotype of dominance in the post-Soviet space had become obsolete. A proposal was brought forward to discuss concrete Russian interests in each country in this space, in order to clarify the opportunities for cooperation with the West in the region. In discussing the scenarios of Russia's development, experts underlined that the option where it becomes a supplier of raw-materials for China could not be ruled out. Arguments were offered against the option presenting Russia as an independent center of force, because this goal would lead to confrontation, so "New Atlantism" was suggested as a positive platform.

However, the scenario envisioning Russia as an independent center of force, and a global governance center is not confrontational. Russia would find it hard to adapt to the new international reality if it had no such role or intention to play it.

A number of participants backed the idea of turning to the concept of humanitarian security. They noted that this notion had originated at the UN, but that the USA lost an interest in it after 2001. It is a rare case when Russia may come out not as a recipient of a concept, but as a contributor to formulating it.

Some experts called for addressing the more specific term "quality of life" instead of "humanitarian security" and a more coordinated approach toward the assistance to

development where Russia plays a major role even now. Leaning on the concept of indivisible security, it is possible to demonstrate the openness of the Russia-EU-USA triangle, inviting a broad range of international organization to cooperate.

The participants supported the proposal to focus on multi-party cooperation as a mechanism to organize joint efforts to tackle concrete problems.

A point was made that nobody was ready to assume responsibility for the post-Soviet space as the instability in the region was gaining momentum. It was proposed to strengthen the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an association whose existence would be of interest both to the EU and the USA.

President of the New Eurasia Foundation Andrei Kortunov drew the theses for the fourth theme of the situational analysis: Global Governance, Institutions, Models, Law. He believes that the ideology of liberalism had always confronted not only the concept of “big government,” but also any variants of “global governance.” Making global governance a reality would require a global and dramatic system failure of the old world order, with liberal conservatism to be replaced by leftist and left of center paradigms. The analyst called for giving a thought to not so much international institutions as international regimes. An effective international regime does not impose its norms upon states, but contributes to the states’ realizing their interests through these norms. A regime is open not only to nation-states, but also to non-governmental entities of world politics.

To supplement his theses, Kortunov suggested reaching accords on specific sub-regional and functional (power engineering, justice) issues, and noted that the mechanism of contact groups (possibly on the Caucasus) might prove to be more effective than permanent institutions.

In his comments on these theses, A.Zagorsky noted the problem of the parties’ negotiability, and called for not setting up new regimes or institutions but strengthening the existing ones. In his opinion, the best option would be Russia’s participation in NATO, or at least, some allied relations, possibly through mechanisms with the Russia-NATO Council.

In the course of the discussion, an opinion was brought forward regarding the need to give up the ideas about a new concert of states or great international organizations. It is necessary to take into account several strata of heterogeneous actors (including religious communities). Although a majority of them are not states, they, too, need protection which should be granted.

It was noted that Euro-Atlantic security cannot be based on a single treaty. To vindicate the point, participants mentioned the global governance plan proposed by the WTO’s incumbent Director-General Pascal Lamy who assigns the key role to the United Nations.

Summing up the results of the situational analysis, Vladimir Baranovsky reminded that the objective of the project was to attain a common understanding of security problems and formulate the constructive ideas which could be acceptable and helpful in setting the Euro-Atlantic security space.

Conceptual Approach: Formulating a Positive Agenda

General Considerations

A new positive Euro-Atlantic security agenda has long been formed under the influence of deep changes in the general situation in Europe and the world as a whole. It is primarily characterized by an objective recession of the risks and threats for security (primarily traditional—military or "hard"—security) that were typical of the Cold War period.

At present, the probability of a major armed conflict in Europe with the involvement of a considerable number of countries is close to zero, if not zero. The probability of interstate armed conflicts and wars in the Euro-Atlantic area, except for its separate peripheral regions (primarily Central Asia) is also minimal.

Residual potential of the escalation of local (mostly domestic) conflicts persists in Europe, primarily in some parts of the post-Soviet area (the South Caucasus and Moldova) and, to a lesser extent, in Southeast Europe (former Yugoslavia and Albania).

These changes found their reflection in a radical reduction in all of the former Warsaw Pact countries' and the NATO countries' (old and new) heavy armaments and armed forces, which could have been intended for territorial defense and/or a large-scale surprise assault or an attack on neighboring states.

Therefore, today's focusing on the issues of "hard" security has no objective basis, but rather is of a subjective nature.

To the forefront of security considerations there have firmly come new cross-border dangers and threats, as well as more extensive threats to international security (such as the threatening proliferation of mass destruction weapons, potential domestic and interstate armed conflicts), which are mainly formed and realized beyond Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area.

At present, counteraction against new challenges and threats to ensure security beyond Europe and neutralize their impact on the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic area has become a top priority (which is also reflected in allocation of national resources) for all the countries in this area, including Russia.

Therefore, there is no need to invent a new positive agenda. It is already there. The only point is *how to proceed to it in an optimal way* and what to do for to make the issues of new transnational security challenges firmly become main ones on the agenda of relations between Russia and the US, NATO and the EU, to prevent "old" and, to a large extent, irrelevant "hard" security issues from hindering the progress, even if not all of them happen to serve in the near future as a satisfactory solution for all the parties.

In this connection, one should take into account the following issues:

- common challenges, to which a joint response should be found by Russia and the West, are generated beyond rather than in Europe;
- the significance of some of these issues, let alone relevant solutions, are frequently viewed differently in Russia, Europe, and the United States, that is there are

almost no examples of challenges that would be equally considered to be existential both in Russia as well as in the West;

- this impedes the search for joint resolutions and the coordination of joint actions, which would be viewed by all the parties as imperative ones and could be accepted as a basis for long-term solutions, including institutional ones, based on mutual cooperation;
- if such long-term solutions could be found, they would most probably not be one-step or universal (something like the European Security Treaty) and would rather result from organic growth in cooperation along the lines of interaction that are relevant to all the parties;
- the most durable solutions pertaining to the approval of the positive agenda for security cooperation can be achieved as a result of a sequential political, economic, and legal *convergence* between Russia and the Western countries, which will ultimately facilitate the reconciliation of institutional frameworks for their interaction, promoting actual or even official *integration* of Russia into the system of Euro-Atlantic security institutions as they develop.

Large Blocks of the New Agenda

Proceeding from the previous and current discussions, it appears to be advisable to focus the main efforts toward enhancing interaction between Russia and the West on three principal directions:

1. Partnership for Modernization

North American and European countries are Russia's only partners in the implementation of its strategy for integrated modernization. As part of the partnership, many issues related to the transformation of Russia can and should be solved, including those pertaining not only to the attraction of investment and modern advanced technologies, but also to the implementation of Russian domestic reforms: ensuring guarantees of private property rights, fair economic and political competition, formation of a law-governed state, a strong independent judicial system, corruption combating efforts, and others.

Partnership for modernization, officially having no direct relationship to the solution of security policy issues, should be regarded as an important mechanism for convergence with European countries and for turning Russia into a modern stable, successful, and democratic country that is able and willing to serve as one of the key partners of the United States and the European Union in the solution of different issues, including those related to international security.

2. International Security: new challenges and settlement of conflicts

If we accept the conclusion that the main challenges for the security of the states and communities of the Euro-Atlantic area are generated beyond this region, then it appears to be advisable to place emphasis on not so much European security issues as activation of efforts aimed at institutionalizing political consultation mechanisms and, most importantly, developing joint solutions, implementing joint and/or parallel actions related to prevention and settlement of local and regional conflicts beyond Europe, and

solving other security issues (a task that we never fulfilled within the framework of Russia-NATO Council).

Consultations and interaction are in place with regard to some important issues on the modern agenda for international security (Afghanistan, Iranian and North Korean nuclear dossiers, Middle East, counterproliferation and nuclear security and safety).

However, it is important to eliminate the following shortcomings in this dialog and interaction:

- regularly arising problems are substantive rather than institutional (we have enough discussion sites, while the formula for "contact groups", whatever their names are, makes it possible to expeditiously form frameworks for discussing specific issues with participants who are flexible in their composition, adding non-Euro-Atlantic countries as necessary); therefore, emphasis should be placed on the approximation of positions and the search for solutions to problems, as was the case, for instance, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s in the course of settlement of the regional conflicts that arose in the Cold War period;
- real partnership in solving international security issues is only possible if Russia (as well as other participants in this process) does not act as a mentor who rejects solution options proposed by other consultation participants, but propose constructive solutions that may suit its partners;
- partnership in solving international security issues would remain superficial if Russia does not make its, even if modest, material contribution to the implementation of coordinated political, military, and/or economic solutions.

3. Global Economic and Financial Regulation and Good Governance World-Wide

Especially with a gradual withering away of the Group of Eight through the nascent mechanisms of the Group of Twenty, it is important to note Russia's institutional participation in the solution of issues related to the regulation and management of global economic processes.

In this connection, it should be understood that in the G20 format, Russia can influence the decision-making process to a lesser extent than in G8. Therefore, important is its participation in the approval and promotion within G20 of the agenda coordinated (as far as possible given, *inter alia*, the disagreements among Western countries) with the leading Euro-Atlantic states.

An important direction that can and should become part of the G20 agenda, which was also on the G8 agenda, is adoption of common good governance criteria aiming developing and the poorest countries at establishing and strengthening domestic development institutions with support from developed countries (a kind of an improved NEPAD program).

In this connection, it should be borne in mind that adoption of good governance and sustainable development standards is one of the key instruments in the policy for prevention of the escalation of local and regional conflicts. This is justifiably considered to be the most important area of the preventive security policy.

Specific Projects

Keeping from anticipating the content of consultations on the partnership for modernization and strengthening of international security and global economic management (they will be filled with specific content as the situation develops), it is important to focus on carrying out several high priority projects, whose implementation would make it possible to essentially strengthen the potential of a positive partnership in the relations between Russia and the West, pushing the arguments and disagreements of recent years into the background.

As we see it, these specific projects are as follows:

It appears advisable to develop ***Partnership for Modernization*** not only along the lines of Russia-EU relations, but also extend it to Russia's and the EU's relations with their common neighbors.

In recent years, the EU Eastern Partnership Program has kept more and more aloof from the interaction between Russia and EU, giving rise to a far from always being justifiable feeling of competition between them in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. This feeling can to a great extent be relieved by trying to maximally harmonize the projects to be implemented as part of the Eastern Partnership with the content of numerous Russia-EU dialogs.

To this end, it is advisable to compare special projects proposed by the EU to its Eastern partners with the agenda of the EU's dialogs with Russia to identify projects:

- coinciding in their content;
- proposed as part of the Eastern Partnership, while also being of interest to Russia's relations with the EU;
- discussed by Russia and the EU, while also being of potential interest for the fulfillment of purposes of the Eastern Partnership Program.

This comparison of agendas as part of a regional forum with the participation of representatives from Russia, the EU, and the six participants of the Eastern Partnership would make it possible to ensure maximum possible convergence of cooperation programs.

The implementation of the Partnership for Modernization not only in Russia-EU relations, but also in Russia's and the EU's relations with their common neighbors could become a general direction of this interaction, as after all that is also about transformation that would ensure modernization in the post-Soviet countries.

Cooperative ABM Defense

It is necessary to use the currently opening (for the third time) window of opportunities to organize cooperation with the United States and NATO in order to create a cooperation-based (cooperative) ABM system for Europe.

This system would hardly be common in the full sense of the word, yet it may be created by combining and integrating the shaping national and multilateral systems for tracking missile launches, missile attack warning, and interception.

Closer cooperation in this area should essentially reduce the intensity of emotions with regard to the United States' European ABM plans and transfer this discussion to a plane of cooperation.

Operational Compatibility with the Russia-NATO Council

In the event of achieving a substantial and constructive dialog on a wide range of international security issues, it is not advisable to a priori exclude the possibility of Russia's participation in operations beyond Europe jointly with the United States and NATO, while employing the NATO rapid deployment forces (no matter whether they would be formed along the NATO lines or as a part of a coalition of interested countries), rather than peacekeeping forces. The have this opportunity, it is necessary to immediately make efforts to ensure compatibility of the Russian rapid deployment forces with the NATO rapid deployment forces (and, on a bilateral basis, with the United States expeditionary strike forces).

In addition to sending an important signal that we do not exclude truly partnership-based and even quasi-allied relations with the United States and NATO, the beginning of these efforts would enable an important additional impetus to be given to the formation of compact expeditionary forces as part of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Interaction with the Russia-NATO Council would also make it possible to alleviate some concerns voiced by the Russian military over their being insufficiently covered with the confidence-building, security, and arms control measures.

The Future of Afghanistan

Stabilization and settlement of the situation in Afghanistan obviously serves at present as the best example of coincidence of important security interests of the Russian Federation, the United States, European NATO member countries, and EU member states. Nobody is interested in the emergence of a new extremist regime here or in a failure of the United States or NATO.

However, there are different views about how the situation may develop with a gradual reduction of the Afghanistan-based forces of NATO and its partners and about what strategy should be pursued after the transfer of power to the Afghan authorities.

This issue should be made central in Russia's dialog with the US, NATO, and the EU countries, with the idea of achieving maximal mutual transparency in the parties' evaluation of the developments and their prospects, as well as political planning (employment options for specific situations), in order to most efficiently synchronize possible actions by the parties for specific ways of development of the situation in Afghanistan and, where possible, coordinate parallel or joint actions for different developments.

Strengthening of OSCE

To agree on the establishment of an OSCE mission in the South Caucasus, thus making its mandate neutral from the viewpoint of the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's status.

To strengthen the ability of OSCE (its acting President) to take certain (well-defined) steps toward preventing the escalation of conflicts, without waiting for the final consensus within OSCE to prevent unnecessary aggravation in the event of escalation.

To make provisions under an informal agreement specifying that OSCE in the South Caucasus and its local branches will be headed only by representatives of neutral states (Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Switzerland).

Fedor Lukyanov

Ideology: Basic Values, Common Purposes, Consolidation, Promoting Democracy

Twenty years after radical changes took place on the European continent, Europe is far from understanding where it is moving and what should be the purposes of its movement. The ideals proclaimed after the Cold War have only partly been attained. Due to the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic institutions—NATO and the European Union—the line dividing the Old World into spheres of competitive influence shifted eastward, yet did not disappear. In other words, a united Europe, whose epoch was proclaimed in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, failed to emerge, although the power balance noticeably changed in favor of the Western structures. Neither Russia nor the countries located between Russia and the EU achieved any stable place in the pan-European architecture.

The fact that the situation preventing the emergence of wars was created on the continent is considered to be the main achievement of the European processes. The construction of a peaceful and prosperous Europe is habitually mentioned among the largest achievements of the 1950s–1990s integration processes and is also called the fruit of a conflict-free dismantlement of the communist system. In reality, however, the post-Cold War period turned out to be far less peaceful than the preceding decades of ideological confrontation. Besides the internecine conflicts (Yugoslavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, and the Russian North Caucasus) provoked by the reshaping of the continental geopolitical map, two regional wars (in Kosovo in 1999 and in South Ossetia in 2008) broke out with the participation of the Great Powers.

The institutions underlying the European policy—NATO, the CFE Treaty, OSCE, the EU, and the CIS—suffer from crises of different depths and durations. The causes of specific crises are different, but on the whole one may say that all of the structures eventually failed to be able to adapt themselves to rapid changes in the world. The main change is the shift of the center of international events to a different part of the planet and the loss by Europe of its importance as the leading global political site and its leading participant. Faced with the increasing competition on the part of the development leaders—the United States and Asia—Europe as a whole still does not realize its real prospects in the 21st century.

Its absorption into the past prevents Europe from looking soberly into the future. In the case of the European Union, this means a flush of the past successes, a kind of autohypnosis, purported to persuade themselves that the ability of the European integration to overcome recessions in the past would make it possible to do so in the future. In other words, the EU proceeds from the feeling of phenomenal successfulness of the integration project in the second half of the 20th century, extrapolating this success to the new century. However, it is not taken into account that the two important "supports" that used to help the Old World focus on its self-development—the presence of a consolidating external menace and the American patronage, which determined a clear-cut interaction framework—are now missing.

Russia is not prepared to transform its great-power identity, which has been intrinsic to it for the past 400 years of its history. Obvious is its ambition to make a comeback after its previous failures and prove to itself and others that the late 20th century geopolitical and economic collapse was a historical accident, and Russia can fully restore its global influence.

Yet, even if these two systems of notions should be considered to be justifiable, it cannot be denied that their respective agendas played out. This has not yet been realized, as high is the inertia of the perception typical of the 20th century with its highly ideologized policies. In addition, both Russia and the EU prefer sticking to their illusions of self-sufficiency, counting, for no particular reasons, on their individual ability to preserve influence.

The European Union reached the peak of its economic, political, and ideological success by the late 20th century, but later its development stalled, as it required a qualitatively different new integration level with a gradual overcoming of national sovereignties and a united Europe's turning into a powerful and competitive international player. A step in this direction was taken by adopting a single European currency, yet this was not followed by relevant further actions toward forming a European economic government and pan-European political identity. On the contrary, the expanded and far less uniform—culturally and politically—European Union not only lost much of its management efficiency, but also started to become stratified into member states of different categories, which runs counter to the very ideological principals of European integration. The feeling of moral standard, which to a large extent underlay the "soft power" of the European model, is weakening due to a growing internal irritation and due to the fact that the EU and NATO reached the geopolitical limit of their "mechanical expansion." Further expansion, if the European elites choose to pursue it, is fraught with economic, political, and even, under the most adverse circumstances, military risks.

This resulted in the emergence of numerous imbalances within Europe, while the existing mechanisms proved to be unable to efficiently level the difference in interests of different countries and country groups. The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was purported to turn the European Union into a consolidated global player, so far has more of an inverse effect than not: the countries having external ambitions seek to achieve them outside the pan-European institutions, specifically, by strengthening bilateral ties with important partners. Meanwhile, the global role of a united Europe is gradually shifting toward that of a respectable-looking atmosphere player. This feeling is aggravated by the European allies' inability to formulate a common vision of NATO's future mission (the visions of Western Europe and Eastern Europe cardinally differ) or display the willingness to help the United States in solving their issues in regions that are far away from Europe.

Russia, in its turn, having recovered from the 1990s geopolitical knockdown, reached the peak of its restorative development by the late 2010s. Its international influence, which could be regained through the abundance of oil and gas and by strengthening public institutions and intensifying foreign-policy activities, was recovered by 2007–2008. However, the potential of the 2000s rapid geopolitical upturn was exhausted and Russia reached the ceiling of its potentialities, at least in its current socioeconomic and political status. The global economic crisis vividly demonstrated the limits of Russia's actual strength for now and for the future. The country with a shrinking population, non-diversified raw-material economy, worn-out infrastructure, and the lowering quality

of human capital cannot count on leading positions as early as in the medium term, let alone in a longer term.

The currently opening opportunities for post-Soviet reintegration may lead to bright political successes in adjacent countries, yet tempt to overstrain in pursuit of prestige and deviate from the domestic modernization paradigm. Meanwhile, the issue of retaining parity with neighboring China, which at present is the world's most rapidly developing country, will most probably become Russia's top priority for foreign-policy development in the nearest years and decades. This will require a qualitative increase in economic efficiency and an intensive attraction of foreign partners for joint projects.

Notwithstanding the complicated dialectics of relations tracing its origin to distant centuries, Russia and Europe, which is currently united in the EU, are *very young geopolitical formations*. Essentially, the Russian Federation and the European Union are of the same age. The Russian tricolor flag symbolizing the collapse of the Soviet Union was unfurled over the Kremlin on December 25, 1991, while the Maastricht Treaty underlying the creation of the European Union was signed a month and a half later. Neither Russia nor Europe had existed within their present-day borders or in their current national-state form. The process of creation of a new identity—a non-imperial Russia, working to adopt democratic forms of government, and the European Union, striving to become a consolidated community of a new type—is proceeding concurrently and with great difficulty. Meanwhile, Europe and Russia mutually influence the creation of each other's identities, traditionally acting as poles of attraction and at the same time repulsion.

In addition to the contradictory internal phenomena in both Russia and the EU, the most important factors for self-identification are external ones—the rapidly changing global environment with its new and unexpected challenges. The formation of a truly multipolar world—the idea always treated positively by the Russians and the Europeans—threatens both Russia and the European Union with *strategic marginalization*. This can be observed at the background of the rapid growth in influence of Asian countries, primarily China, and the related shift in the United States' focus from the Euro-Atlantic area to the Asia-Pacific region. It appears that in the nearest few years this process will take explicit and irreversible forms, which will sharply cause the Russian and European governments to face the issue of finding their place in the 21st century world.

The task, whose solution will determine the future of both Eurasia and the entire global policy, is to form within 10–15 years *a common geopolitical identity of Russia and the European Union*, which is associated with the necessity for giving *a new impetus to the development on an extended basis*. If this does not happen, each of the separate resulting identities will probably focus on the idea of "strength" and defense of its own notion about itself from the increasing pressure from external circumstances. As a result, both the European Union and Russia run the risk of turning in a few decades from *subjects into objects* of the global process.

Russia's integration into the common European space on the basis of common values and technical criteria, which was counted on in the late 20th century, did not materialize. The preventive factor was not so much the ideological discrepancies as the geopolitical incompatibility of the two actors, each of whom has its own ambitions for independence and leadership. Probably, the realization of the geopolitical reality of this

century, which has not opened any brilliant prospects for neither Russia nor the European Union, will make them take a new look at the integration issues.

Russia and Europe need a conceptually new agenda corresponding to the realities of the 21st century:

- Greater Europe's returning to the center of global policy;
- overcoming the existing division of Europe in the context of economic interpenetration and eliminating the remaining internal security threats;
- achieving economic dynamism and enhancing competitiveness, striking a new balance between the social security system and flexible intensive development;
- settling the issue of identity while the indigenous population is decreasing and the foreign culture element is increasing in all European countries, preserving the cultural and political uniqueness in a global permeable environment.

The discussion led for the entire 20-year period about values, as a uniting or dividing factor in the relations between Russia and the other parts of Europe, oftentimes was of an opportunistic nature. If viewed *pragmatically*, this situation appears to be quite solvable.

The *European values* in the context of this discussion are not a list of fixed postulates. They are a set of empirically developed basic principles about how a modern state should be organized to be able to perform its functions most efficiently. These principles include separation of powers, independent legal proceeding, freedom of information, balance of individual and societal interests, etc. In accordance with the historical experience gained by the European nations, it is these rules of social-state structure that are optimal for national development. The way to their implementation, however, was long and winding. In addition, none of them is a dogma established once and forever. The strength of the rational European approach has always lied in flexibility. It is quite obvious that "values" can serve as a uniting factor only in their most general way and the attempt to unify their concrete implementation, for instance, in Sweden, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Italy, would have caused a collapse of the entire system.

Russia, due to the specific features of its historical development, is farther from the implementation of the principles that are called "European values." The Russian history demonstrates an intermittent adoption of European standards in certain historical periods, which was accompanied with a difficult process of overcoming its traditions and relapsing between those periods. A special note should be made of the fact that the present-day Russian authorities, whatever their current relations with Europe and the West might be, do not deny the necessity for Russia to develop along the European lines, while the issue under discussion is that of the rate and forms of this development. In this regard, anti-European sentiments (meaning the perception of the model, rather than the foreign policy) now play a lesser role in Russia than in former times. Interestingly, the modern Europe is often criticized in Russia for its deviation from the approaches that made it successful in the history, while the EU is criticized for dogmatism, excessive bureaucracy, and inflexibility.

The adoption by Russia of the "European values," that is the principles of modern management, will develop as the active layers of Russia's population realize that these values promote the achievement of results, that is efficiency and progress.

Generally, *efficiency should become the key notion* for the Greater Europe. In the ever-increasing competitive environment, the European Union's and Russia's economic and political models yield to the more adaptive and dynamic economies existing in the other parts of the world. The idea of a joint progress for development, which was once formulated by the Founding Fathers of the European integration, should again become in demand within the entire Greater Europe. Once, Jean Monnet devised an integration formula that brought Western Europe to an unprecedented success in the second half of the 20th century: a determined large-scale political objective (for durable peace), reliance on economic means that are suitable for the participants (consolidation of strategic assets to minimize expenses), and observation of equality through a parity delegation of sovereign functions to supranational bodies.

At present, the process of further integration in the European Union is confronted by internal and external obstacles. Internally, we can see the sovereign states' unwillingness to give up on the essential elements of their national sovereignty and take a step toward federal government in Europe, which could substantially enhance its efficiency in the international arena. The external obstacle is the opposition on the part of Russia, whose objective is to prevent the countries to the East of the Europe Union from being drawn into the area of the EU's economic influence and that of NATO's political influence and who is willing to take a risk to stop the logic of "a Europe of concentric circles."

To continue the process of transformation of Europe, overcome its division, make the maximal use of its competitive advantages, retrieve its global role, and secure peace and stability, it is necessary to employ as large-scale an approach as the one taken by the initiators of unification of Western Europe in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. But this time it should cover the entire Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. A clear-cut objective and a sober estimation of the reality will also make it possible to find means to reconcile contradictions as was the case 60 years ago.

A New Paradigm: from a Peaceful Coexistence to Joint Actions

1. The "new formulas" of Russian foreign and security policy formulated in the past two decades have had their day and need to be replaced:

- The calls for ensuring "multipolarity" were of a compensatory nature: with a weakened Russia and an aggressive and nonconstructive (former) US government, Moscow was concerned that an Americanocentric "unipolarity" might be established in the international system. As the European Union and China became stronger as complex centers of power in the past two decades, while Russia itself partially recuperated, "multipolarity" was acknowledged and the future of an Americanocentric "unipolarity" stopped causing former concerns.
- The "peaceful coexistence" formula was inherited from the previous stage of overcoming the direct confrontation between the socio-political systems and ideologies. Just as the "*easing of international tensions*" ("détente"), it was a progressive step as compared with the previous "battle between the two system" formulas, but in the post-Cold War period it redundantly emphasizes *separatedness and disunity* of the world and *temporariness* of peaceful coexistence (as the Soviet-period formula did not mean giving up on trying to "overcome" the West in the long term).
- The often repeated in recent years¹ formula of "*pragmatism*," as the main line of the Russian foreign policy, made it possible to efficiently dispose of the former ideologically motivated alliances (specifically, differentiate the policy for the "fraternal" CIS countries and CEE countries, "withdraw" from most of the developing countries with whom they were linked by "socialist orientation," and change the "benchmark" for the regional balances of North Korea–South Korea, Israel–Syria, etc. However, the passive "pragmatism" is of a "transit" nature. It is suitable for critical times, yet it cannot remain a political paradigm for a superpower aspiring to become an active global actor.

Proposed in the articles by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. V. Lavrov², the "*global competition in a civilizational dimension*" formula (accompanied with an explanation that "the subject of competition now includes values and development models") is more adequate, yet it emphasizes disunity and competitiveness among the large "civilizational islands" and evokes unnecessary associations with Huntington's and Fukuyama's terminology.

The latter formula of the new paradigm may find a different development, if it relies on the "*social model*" notion, rather than on the notion of "civilizations" (whose number in

¹ Including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' comments and explanations for "The Concept for the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" as amended in the two latest versions.

² S. V. Lavrov, "Russia and the World in the 21st Century," *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 4, 2008.

the modern world is by definition not more than a dozen and who require being "aggregated" of different countries into large "civilizational islands" involuntarily played off one against another).

There are dozens of individual models of economic and socio-political development in the world. Some of them were individually developed within one country, while others were developed as common models for several similar countries. *The social model (whether it be the "the American model" or "the Russian model") is a unique historically developed combination of specific features of the economic, political, and social organization of the society.* As distinguished from "formations" and "civilizations," the "social model" notion covers not only "common," but also unique (including political and cultural) specific features of different countries.

In this paradigm, the globalizing world is represented as a parallel complementary development of many dozens of social models, which respond to the challenges of socio-political development somewhat differently, compete, yet seldom overtake or oust one another. Instead of two opposing hockey teams, one of which should necessarily beat the other in a hard game, we have a metaphor of two hundred athletes moving at different paces in the same direction in a marathon.

In the global interaction of social models, there may be disagreement among them, but also possible is a pragmatic mutual assistance, as well as an adaptation of the best practices from different models without any "ideological" rejection. This approach does not presuppose any unifying of models, pulling them apart to "the poles," or creating a unified "universal" model suitable for all. In this context, the "Russian model" of sociopolitical structure appears to be, firstly, equitable; secondly, already accomplished; thirdly, exportable and suitable for the borrowing by others of its best features; and fourthly, capable of adopting successful practices from different models without any ideological "constraints."

2. Russia has four possible directions to develop the *new paradigm pertaining to foreign policy and security* (excluding the confrontational options).

The first direction is to *become a full-fledged "pole"* in the global policy with its own distinct and intensively exported social model, consequently, with its own "camp" of allies and followers. This process, requiring reideologization of the foreign policy and designation of its zone of interests, does not presuppose any symbiosis with NATO or the EU, but requires purposeful development of the system of its own alliances (CSTO, EurAsEC, SCO, BRIC, etc.). Essentially, this is a formula of *Russia as a leading regional power* with its own region and some (limited) global interests.

The second direction is to *confirm Russia's European orientation and become part of the Wider West*; without officially joining NATO, build special relations with NATO enabling partnership that would be not inferior to the official membership; allow the EU and NATO to settle, together with Russia, post-Soviet conflicts, which will have its own geopolitical "minuses" and "pluses"; renounce the treatment of the CIS, CSTO, SCO, and BRIC as "alternative to the West" projects; bring the Western and Eastern regional international organizations to a common "conference table" and achieve allocation of functions and responsibilities among them.

The third direction is to *identify itself with the developed "North"*; not to join the "West," but rather connect Russia and the West in a single global "North," which will

jointly focus on both its own sustainable development issues and the those of the global "South"; return to the mentality of "global area of responsibility"; create a common Moscow–Brussels–Washington mechanism for the settlement of conflicts (international interference in conflicts); deemphasize the UN mechanisms and emphasize the one of G8 as the main epicenter for making decisions on global security, making sure that the criteria of economic and innovative sophistication, rather than those of "democraticity," be regarded as systemic factors of the global North."

The fourth direction is to *become an "ordinary developed country" adopting the advantages offered by the globalization process*; lower the importance of sovereignty and the superiority of "Russian things" over "foreign things"; set the objective of economic and cultural development of our citizens and our society in the global community; attain the abolition of visas with the EU and an appreciable development in the Russia-EU common (legal, economic, etc.) space; not to demand a total victory, yet achieve dependable guarantees for its own social model against a total defeat; develop our own Russian model, while acknowledging the equality of dozens other different models; participate in a competitive (yet unfrontational) parallel development of different social models; rely more on the mechanisms of the UN and other international organizations; become an "ordinary developed country" having no messianic ambitions, yet with improving living standards.

3. Is the Euro-Atlantic security configuration correct, possible?

How does the choice of a foreign-policy and security paradigm affect the strategic values and structure of the Euro-Atlantic security?

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the *post-Soviet space collapsed* both geostrategically and geopolitically. Sovietism can still be observed in certain regimes, especially in Central Asia, but *the common Soviet past stopped being a systemic main connecting factor* for the group of new independent states established two decades ago on the territory of the collapsed Soviet Union. Their policies and place in the world are already affected to a greater extent by new geopolitical orientations and the new structure of trade and economic relations than by the former "*post-Soviet brotherhood*."

The former post-Soviet space underwent an internal differentiation and a split into competing geopolitical and geoeconomic entities (the CSTO–GUAM opposition, oil pipeline systems competing in the interests of different CIS countries, etc.).

The fact that a group of countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus became full OSCE members (Kazakhstan chairs OSCE in 2009–2010), "neighbors" of the European Union (objects of the EU's Neighborhood Policy), and participants of NATO's Partnership for Peace program caused not only a diffusion of the post-Soviet space, but also an *erosion of the Euro-Atlantic area*. Caucasian and Central Asian conflicts become part of the Euro-Atlantic security agenda, overloading it appreciably.

The simultaneous *globalization of the European Union's and NATO's security-related functions and responsibility area*³ brought about a further erosion of the Euro-Atlantic

³ Of the 14 operations conducted by the EU in the conflict zones in recent years, only 2 continue in Europe, while the remaining ones are carried out in North Africa, Asia, including Indonesia. Meanwhile, the Afghan mission became NATO's main operation in recent years. As for the future, the possibility of NATO's participation in a peacekeeping operation in the Near East is under consideration.

area. As a result, common security mechanisms and even security decision-making became impossible for the entire extended Euro-Atlantic area (from Vancouver to Afghanistan and Vladivostok). Common conflict settlement and peacekeeping mechanisms failed to emerge for such diverse conflict groups as the former Yugoslavia, Moldova/Transnistria, Karabakh, Abkhazia/South Ossetia, Afghanistan/Pakistan. In these regions, the domination of different countries, different organizations, and different conflict management models was historically established over two decades.

Should Russia embark on the same globalization of its security functions and responsibility area as was demonstrated by the European Union and NATO?

Considering the fact that the aggregate military budget of the NATO member countries exceeds that of the CSTO member countries 25–29 times (depending on calculation methods in comparable exchange rates), it is obvious that not only a new global parity, but also any serious projection of the CSTO member countries' interests to areas beyond their region is feasible. However, such organizations as CSTO, SCO, and such less structured alliances as BRIC and OIC can perform unique functions in the division of security efforts, which would require much greater efforts on the part of the other participants of the political process.

Consequently, it is becoming imperative to *organize a negotiation process related to the division and complementarity of functions (especially in conflict management) among regional international organizations having specific security (OSCE, the EU, NATO, CSTO, SCO, etc.) In addition to the security dialog among "the Great Powers," a direct dialog among "the great organizations" is necessary.*

4. What joint Euro-Atlantic security actions by Russia and the West are possible and realistic from among the second, third, and fourth scenarios?

In the Sphere of Nuclear Arms Control and Limitation:

- Early achievement of the New START Treaty ceilings for the deployed warheads and delivery vehicles; Adoption of the New START Treaty Protocol for the further reduction of the ceilings (under 1,000 for the deployed warheads and under 500 for the delivery vehicles);
- Harmonization of the ban on nuclear arms deployment beyond the national territory; withdrawal of the United States' remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Western Europe with the compensatory unilateral measures on the part of Russia with regard to its own TNW;
- Announcement by the United States and Russia of initial data on tactical nuclear weapons and inclusion of the TNW issue in the negotiations agenda;
- Joint pressure on the part of the United States and Russia on the third nuclear states with regard to their joining the multilateral nuclear arms negotiations;
- Further development and adoption of the Convention on the Ban on Production of New Nuclear Materials;
- Joint actions (including international financing and technical assistance) for verifiable elimination of the breakout nuclear potentials (nuclear warheads removed yet not eliminated).

In the Sphere of Conventional Arms Control and Limitation:

- Urgent revival of the CFE Treaty. Ratification of the adapted Treaty by the Western countries, abandonment by Russia of its policy for suspending its participation in the CFE Treaty. Further adaptation of the Treaty with the new geopolitical realities in mind (a new group of countries joined NATO since the time of its previous adaptation in the late 1990s) and cancellation of the flank limitations as inadequate to the current environment. Resumption of the practice of transparency and exchange of data on all types and kinds of conventional arms among the participating countries;
- Further development and adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions;
- Further development and adoption of the Convention on Governing the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies;
- Activation of the transparency mechanisms as part of regular data submissions by the countries to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

In the Sphere of Conflict Management and Peacekeeping Operations in the Euro-Atlantic Area:

- Creation of a *unified arsenal of peacekeeping forces* accessible to the UN for the employment in the course of peacekeeping operation under the UNSC mandate, which would include: the NATO rapid deployment forces, the European Union's rapid deployment forces, and the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces;
- Admission of Russia, on the basis of equality, to the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center; activation of the OSCE CPC as a universal information and management resource for conflicts;
- Involvement of the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe, and OSCE structures, together with Russia, in the political settlement negotiations for Transnistria/Moldova, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Georgia, Karabakh, along with the involvement of Russia, on the basis of equality, to the further political settlement concerning Serbia/Kosovo.

In the Sphere of Soft Security:

- Combination of the CSTO and NATO efforts and mechanisms to create a *counter-drugs belt* along the northern borders of Afghanistan;
- Development of *anti-terrorist cooperation* by the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center (Moscow), the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (Tashkent), and the anti-terrorist structures of the United States and the NATO member countries;
- *Disaster control cooperation* (cooperation between Russia's and the West's EMERCOM structures) to be made top priority efforts toward developing mechanisms designed for creating joint decision - making centers, coordinating quotas of joint financial expenditures, as well as joint contingent training and employment.

Global Governance: International Institutions, Model, and Law

According to the established tradition, the term "global governance" means "management of global processes in the absence of a global government." The interpretation of global governance content, governance process entities, and rules that are (should be) followed in global governance widely vary depending on political, methodological, and disciplinary preferences of discussion participants. Specifically, there are divergences of principle among so called "realist" and "liberal internationalists" in the evaluation of the status and prospects of global governance. Global security governance crucially differs in some parameters from global development governance. In these theses, the author restricts the discussion to the part of the problem pertaining to the status and potential restructuring of the main international institutions aspiring to participate in global governance.

Traditionally, international institutions are convenient objects for criticism on the part of different politicians, experts, and the general public. They focus on bureaucracy, inflexibility, corruption, unwillingness and inability to take action in critical situations, etc. One can hear an opinion that the role of international organizations in the future global policy should weaken and that unwieldy and cumbersome structures (including the UN, NATO, and OSCE) will inevitably be replaced by *ad hoc* coalitions of governments established to solve specific issues (for instance, a coalition of countries who participated in the 2003 intervention in Iraq, or G20 established in 2008 to combat the global financial crisis). In this context, the role of "traditional" international organizations will be chiefly reduced to provision of discussion sites, PR efforts by individual states, influence on international public opinions, etc.

This criticism of international institutions is to a large extent fair. However, we should remember that, in the final analysis, international (interstate) institutions have never existed and do not exist all by themselves, they always reflect the interests and aspirations of their member states. Naturally, internal inertia, resistance to change, bureaucratic conservatism, and other features are characteristic of any institution (all the more so of such large and cumbersome ones as the UN, NATO, or the EU), but an institution's autonomy from its member states has its own limits. Thinking of the reasons for inefficiency of the system of international institutions in the present-day world, it is obvious that we should ask ourselves why the governments establishing these institutions do not consider it necessary to show political will, persistence, and consistency while reforming the established system.

Probably, the most obvious explanation for the idea of global governance having made no progress over decades is unwillingness on the part of countries (to be more exact, their political leaders) to sacrifice some part of their sovereignty, delegating it to international institutions. This unwillingness becomes especially obvious during socioeconomic turbulence, growing global or regional instability, systemic shifts in the global policy, i.e. exactly when the need for global governance sharply increases. As a rule, long-term interests of systemic stabilization are sacrificed to short-term narrowly-

understood national interests, while the temptation to resort to unilateral measures happens to be stronger than the understanding of the values of collective actions.

Another obvious obstacle on the path to the enhancement of efficiency of international institution is the natural desire of member states to fix their positions in these institutions as a guarantee of status and preferences under the changing balance of global forces. For example, the resistance of some permanent UNSC members (including Russia) to the attempts made to reform the UN Security Council and the UN as a whole can be explained by the desire to preserve the status quo; the United States assumes similar positions with regard to possible reforms of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It so happens that the inevitable payment for maintaining the status quo is the growing gap between the international institutions and the changing realities of the global policy, and, consequently, a gradual marginalization of these institutions.

In recent decades, the opposition to the development of international institutions is joining a deeper and more powerful opposition to the globalization process as a whole. Most of modern international institutions (both security institutions and development institutions) are regarded by a considerable part of the population—including the population in the Western countries—as weapons of globalization and as instruments of anonymous and public-control-free forces undermining local traditions, local interests, cultural characteristics, and habitual lifestyles on the whole. Paradoxically, international institutions are criticized simultaneously as a manifestation of archaic organizational principles of the 20th century old world (with its hierarchy, bureaucracy, and traditional principles of governance) and as a symbol of threats on the part of the 20th century post-modernistic world (globalization, destruction of hierarchy, networked organization, and irrationalism).

The history shows that the interest in global governance tends to arise after systemic crises of the global order, when low efficiency of the old mechanisms for governing the global order becomes obvious. This happened before World War I (the establishment of the League of Nations and some regional and sub-regional international institutions) and after World War II (the UN system, the Bretton Woods System, etc.). In both cases the global governance reforms were initiated by the victor countries trying to fix the new global "rules of the game" and cooptate their former opponents into the new world order. On the whole, the experience gained in the mid-20th century can be considered to be successful, as, despite of all the costs and restraints, the system of international institutions established in the late 1940s and the early 1950s functioned for more than half a century and to a great extent continues to serve as a basis of the modern world order.

Noteworthy would be an objective analysis of the reasons why the third systemic crisis of the world order in the 20th century (the termination of the "Cold War," the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the USSR itself, a fundamental crisis of communism and leftist political movements worldwide) did not give rise to any global governance reforms similar to those carried out after World War I and World War II. This analysis is important primarily because it should give an answer to the question about the feasibility and advisability of reaching a new level of global governance at present and in the near future—in the first quarter of the 21st century (i.e. what new phenomena, players, processes, and interests should emerge in the world so that the failed attempt of a global reform in the epoch of restructuring (perestroika) and "new mentality" could have chances of success).

Numerous explanations for inertia, rigidity, and stability of the old institutions and the absence of any global governance reforms in the last decade of the 20th century can be reduce to three main reasons.

Firstly, the liquidation of the Soviet bloc in Europe and the subsequent collapse of the USSR itself was a conflict-free process with a low level of violence, while the overcoming of the communist legacy in other regions of world (primarily in Asia) happened to require an extended period of time. That is why the need for global reforms was not as obvious as after the World Wars, so relevant global coalitions were not formed.

Secondly, the ideology of liberalism, which turned out to be prevalent after the collapse of communism, poorly combines in nature with the idea of global governance; consistent liberals always intensively opposed not only the concept of "larger government," but also any variation on the themes of "world government" or "global governance." It was assumed that market mechanisms, which became universal after the end of the "Cold War," could operate better than any other alternative mechanisms of global governance. For this approach, it has always been preferable to have a noninstitutionalized political management of global processes, which could be expressed both in the form of a global consensus of democratic countries and in the form of a unilateral global dominance of the leading power (the United States, during the last decade of the 20th century).

Thirdly, the political systems established in the Western countries by the late 20th century are organically incapable of any long-term strategic planning (new global governance institutions need a protracted period of time to reach their "designed capacity") or mobilizing political and economic resources (world order reforms require programs as large-scale the Marshall Plan and larger). The lack of possibility for strategic planning and the inability to mobilize resources prevent the Western democracies from taking the actual lead in reforming the global policy on the basis of a transition to efficient global governance.

Following this logic, one may suppose that a combination of a whole range of conditions, which were absent in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, is required to put the issue a new global governance into practice.

Firstly, there should occur a global and dramatic systemic failure of the old world order (a "second edition" of global financial crisis, a nuclear conflict in the Middle East, a series of large-scale terrorist attacks in Europe and North America, a global technological or climatic disaster).

Secondly, a transition to global governance is possible on a non-liberal ideological basis (In other words, a liberal conservatism of the last decade type should be replaced by leftist and left-of-center paradigms: near-left democrats in the United States, social democrats in Europe, socialists in Japan, etc.).

Thirdly, only countries capable of long-term strategic planning and resource mobilizing can lead in the formation of priorities and in the creation of global governance mechanisms; this means that the Western democracies should either change considerably, or non-Western political systems and actors (China, the BRIC countries, etc.) will take the initiative. By all appearances, the combination of these prerequisites looks unlikely in the near future; therefore, it is hardly justifiable to forecast a "third

wave" of global governance in the classic format of the 20th century "large projects (although one cannot completely rule out the combination of necessary prerequisites).

However, the history of development of international institutions in the past two decades is far from being so unequivocal, given not only its global, but also regional dimension. The experience of expansion of the European Union (to a lesser extent of NATO) shows that institutional development does not always follow the general rules specified above. In the case of the EU, the candidate countries deliberately went for a significant limitation of their national sovereignty (which was all the more painful considering the fact that they had recently gained sovereignty after the collapse of the Soviet bloc) and agreed to follow the European Union's stringent and complicated standards and procedures. On the other hand, the "old" EU member states decided on an expansion against their immediately economic interests, and the "Expansion vs. Deepening" discussion ended in the victory of those who advocated expansion. The economic, political, and institutional costs of expansion were obvious from the very beginning, but this did not stop the process for admission of new member states.

It appears that the European Union's expansion experience shows that the development of international institutions in the 21st structure will be determined by not only the interests of the member states, but also by predominant social values and the notions of national and group identity. In this context, regional (and global in the future) governance results from not only the concurrence of state interests, but also the community of culture, formal and informal dialog standards, customs, morals, and values. It is adherence to them that forms a certain unity and constitutes a distinctive feature of all those who belong to it, ensuring an enhanced level of trust and mutual understanding among those who feel and acknowledge their membership in this unity. It is not difficult to foretell that it would be much harder to solve the issues of values and identity on a global basis than on a regional one; however, without solving these issues (a kind of "Washington Consensus" for the new global reality) it is premature to discuss global governance issues.

Specifically, this implies the importance of *international regimes for the transition to more advanced forms of global governance (with the term "regime" meaning a common body of principles, standards, rules, and procedures pertaining to specific areas of the global policy or economy). The notion "international regime" is not only wider than the notion "international institution", but it also presupposes a higher flexibility in the cooperation of activities of independent states and other participants of the global policy.* For instance, the regime of nuclear non-proliferation, to one extent or another, also includes most of the countries who have not signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (in the sense that they in their activities take into account the negative consequences of possible proliferation). An efficient international regime does not foster its standards upon the countries, while making it happen that the countries implement their interests through these norms and standards. For a member country, adherence to the standards of an international regime ensures minimization of costs and maximization of advantages gained from an international community of nations.

The employment of international regimes (security regime, trade and economic and financial regimes, information regime, energy regime, environmental regime, etc.), as an intermediate stage on the way toward the restructuring of the system of international institutions, can make it possible to solve the issue of values and group identity on a less stringent basis than under the traditional world order systems based on international institutions. Another advantage of an international regime as compared with an

international institution is that it is open not only to national state, but also to such non-state actors of the global policy as corporations, social movements, political parties, individual regions of large states, etc. All these numerous and oftentimes incommensurable entities enter into an intensive multilateral interaction, gradually adopting new rules of the game, opportunities, and limitations resulting from international cooperation.

The development of global international regimes will require a substantial *transformation of the existing international legal instruments*. Obviously, an alteration of international law principles, where the top priority should involve not the sovereignty of states, but their global responsibility, let alone their subordination to global governance institutions, is extremely unlikely. More probable is the formation of separate components of "constitutional law of nations" (as a universal *jus gentium* in the univesalist global sense). The most important components of this future law of nations should include (and they are already being gradually included) transnational legal guarantees for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms wherever and, consequently, the legal right to impose specific sanctions against those who violate these rights. Similar transnational legal regulations may be formed, for example, in the field of environment and natural resources utilization as a whole, in the field of access to global information resources, etc. Another aspect of this is a universal "validation of supranational decisions" as applied to selective spheres of social and economic life.

The development of international legal component of global governance will apparently result in the establishment of numerous institutions of supranational legal proceedings and the expansion of the range of supranational investigatory actions. For a variety of reasons, the "internationalization" of judicial power is a relatively easier and less painful process than the "internationalization" of executive and legislative power. This process is already happening and there are no reasons to believe that it may slow down; on the contrary, one may confidently predict it further acceleration in different forms (so called "transnational" or even "global justice").

If the above global governance model is the most probable one for the medium term (10 – 15 years), then it is important for Russia to sharply intensify its efforts toward forming its top priority international regimes and participating in their further functioning. This does not mean that Russia should fully give up on attempting to reform the existing international institutions (the UN, OSCE, the CIS, WTO, IMF, the World Bank, etc.) or create new institutions (SCO, BRIC). Yet the real global governance will, by all appearances, develop on a regime basis, rather than on an institution basis. The efforts along the regime lines will require a substantial renovation of the research, information, personnel, and resource support for the Russian foreign policy; a higher efficiency of interdepartmental interaction; and development of a new system of relations among the government, the private sector, and civil society institutions in the implementation of common objectives for engaging Russia in global governance mechanisms on the most favorite terms for our nation.

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On Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

The EASI project, launched by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is implemented by the group of prominent politicians and experts from Russia, the USA and Europe with the goal to elaborate proposals on the new Euro-Atlantic security structure.

The EASI Commission co-chairmen are: former Senator Sam Nunn for the USA, former German Deputy Foreign Minister Wolfgang Ischinger for Europe, and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov for Russia. IMEMO is the key partner of the project in Russia. All participants in the project see the solution of the problems not through the prism of Russian-Western relations, but in the context of common threats to security. Such an approach effectively promotes the Russian vision of all-European security. The President of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized as expedient the EASI project and Russia's active participation in it.